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Abstract	  MICKEL,	  CHELSEA	  	  	  Study	  of	  Russian	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  Former	  Soviet	  Union,	  specifically	  the	  Caucasus	  region.	  Departments	  of	  Political	  Science	  and	  Russian	  Language,	  March	  2015	  	  
Advisors:	  Michele	  Angrist,	  Kristin	  Bidoshi	  	   	  My	  research	  focuses	  on	  Russia's	  foreign	  policy	  interests	  and	  actions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  post-­‐soviet	  space	  and	  its	  relations	  with	  western	  nations	  and	  organizations.	  I	  used	  three	  case	  studies:	  the	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  Conflict,	  the	  Russo-­‐Georgian	  War,	  and	  the	  Crimean	  Crisis.	  The	  Russian	  government	  has	  pursued	  intervention	  in	  these	  areas	  for	  various	  reasons.	  The	  most	  prominent	  of	  these	  reasons	  are	  ethnicity,	  religion,	  irredentism,	  great	  power	  politics,	  and	  economics.	  	  The	  Armenian-­‐Azerbaijani	  conflict	  centers	  on	  the	  Eastern	  Orthodox	  Armenian	  enclave	  in	  the	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  region	  of	  Azerbaijan,	  a	  nation	  otherwise	  consisting	  of	  a	  majority	  of	  Turkic	  Sunni	  Muslims.	  The	  Russo-­‐Georgian	  War	  was	  fought	  in	  the	  separatist	  regions	  of	  South	  Ossetia	  and	  Abkhazia.	  Ethnic	  issues	  were	  a	  part	  of	  the	  outbreak	  in	  fighting,	  but	  fighting	  also	  erupted	  due	  to	  Georgia	  becoming	  a	  transport	  state	  for	  oil	  and	  natural	  gas	  through	  the	  Baku-­‐Tbilisi-­‐Ceyhan	  Pipeline.	  Russia	  sees	  Georgia	  as	  a	  competitor	  and	  so	  aided	  separatist	  rebels.	  The	  Crimea	  Crisis	  was	  studied	  in	  the	  context	  of	  current	  events	  and	  the	  history	  of	  the	  marginalized	  Muslim	  Tatars	  in	  the	  region.	  I	  analyze	  Russia's	  motivations	  for	  intervention,	  the	  type	  of	  intervention	  it	  pursued,	  international	  mediation,	  and	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  conflicts.	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Russia’s	  Post	  Soviet	  Foreign	  Policy	  Former	  Soviet	  Union:	  Hard	  power	  and	  Economics	  in	  the	  Near	  Abroad	  	   Security	  is	  the	  largest	  priority	  of	  Russia,	  which	  is	  an	  immense	  and	  diverse	  nation.	  According	  to	  Buzan,	  “Security	  means	  the	  ability	  of	  states	  and	  societies	  to	  maintain	  their	  independent	  identity	  and	  their	  functional	  integrity”	  (Buzan	  1991).	  Russia’s	  foreign	  policy	  towards	  the	  Former	  Soviet	  Union	  encompasses	  geopolitics,	  neo-­‐imperialism,	  and	  military	  interventionism.	  The	  Russian	  government	  deems	  this	  space	  the	  “near	  abroad”	  and	  considers	  the	  region	  within	  the	  primary	  sphere	  of	  Russian	  influence.	  One	  of	  the	  sole	  examples	  of	  Russia’s	  use	  of	  soft	  power	  since	  the	  1990’s	  is	  its	  creation	  of	  the	  CIS	  (Commonwealth	  of	  Independent	  States),	  an	  organization	  symbolic	  of	  regional	  cooperation	  between	  Russian	  and	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  the	  CSTO	  (Collective	  Security	  Treaty	  Organization).	  The	  CSTO	  is	  a	  synthesis	  of	  Russia’s	  cooperation	  with	  and	  power	  over	  its	  former	  dominion.	  Belarus,	  Armenia,	  and	  the	  Central	  Asian	  states	  are	  a	  part	  of	  this	  organization	  (Oldberg	  p.37).	  The	  Russian	  government	  believes	  that	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Republics	  need	  Russian	  directives	  to	  form	  effective	  governing	  bodies,	  and	  believes	  that	  the	  organizations	  previously	  stated	  add	  much-­‐needed	  structure	  to	  the	  region	  while	  enabling	  Russian	  predominance	  in	  the	  Former	  Soviet	  Union.	  In	  the	  early	  1990’s,	  nationalism	  was	  largely	  undeveloped,	  and	  key	  regional	  leaders	  had	  not	  come	  forward	  to	  form	  efficient	  governments.	  	  	  It	  is	  true	  that	  even	  today,	  states	  part	  of	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union	  have	  trouble	  replacing	  the	  autocratic,	  state	  controlled,	  crony	  system	  deeply	  embedded	  from	  
Soviet	  times.	  Russia	  maintains	  its	  control	  over	  the	  region	  mainly	  through	  military	  means,	  justified	  by	  the	  elites	  as	  protecting	  Russian	  minorities	  in	  post-­‐Soviet	  states.	  “The	  [Russian]	  administration	  frequently	  exploited	  concerns	  about	  institutionalized	  discrimination	  against	  the	  diaspora	  to	  apply	  crude	  pressure	  on	  FSU	  (Former	  Soviet	  Union)	  governments”	  (Lo	  p.78).	  	  The	  most	  recent	  example	  of	  this	  is	  in	  Eastern	  Ukraine	  and	  Crimea,	  but	  also	  notably	  in	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia,	  once	  a	  part	  of	  Georgia,	  now	  separated	  and	  regarded	  as	  sovereign	  regions	  by	  the	  Russian	  government.	  Russia	  intervened	  upon	  claims	  that	  Georgia	  was	  planning	  a	  mass	  genocide	  on	  ethnic	  Russians	  in	  these	  regions.	  The	  Russian	  government	  believes	  that	  it	  is	  the	  primary	  cultural	  and	  political	  facilitator	  in	  the	  region.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  conviction,	  Russia	  is	  bitterly	  against	  NATO	  (North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization)	  membership	  expansion	  into	  Eastern	  and	  Central	  European	  states	  as	  well	  as	  states	  within	  the	  Caucasus.	  Russia	  views	  NATO	  as	  a	  remnant	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  that	  the	  west	  uses	  to	  propagate	  the	  idea	  of	  Russia	  as	  ‘other’.	  	  The	  Russian	  government	  is	  also	  concerned	  about	  post	  soviet	  states	  becoming	  members	  of	  the	  EU	  (European	  Union).	  The	  Baltic	  republics;	  Estonia,	  Latvia,	  and	  Lithuania	  are	  already	  member	  states.	  The	  Baltic	  States	  formed	  nationalist	  tendencies	  far	  earlier	  and	  vigorously	  than	  their	  Eurasian	  counterparts,	  and	  this	  has	  allowed	  them	  to	  integrate	  with	  Westernized	  nations	  in	  a	  way	  that	  Russia	  feels	  is	  threatening	  to	  its	  interests	  as	  primary	  regional	  actor	  and	  world	  power.	  In	  summation,	  Russia’s	  foreign	  policy	  in	  regards	  to	  post	  soviet	  space	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  Russia’s	  New	  “Monroe	  Doctrine”.	  This	  concept	  stems	  from	  United	  
States	  President	  James	  Monroe,	  who	  believed	  that	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  Americas	  should	  be	  exclusively	  under	  U.S.	  influence.	  Russia	  uses	  this	  idea	  to	  justify	  its	  claims	  in	  Eastern	  and	  Central	  Europe,	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  former	  U.S.S.R.	  (Skak	  p.139).	  	  The	  Baltic	  States	  are	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  rule	  in	  terms	  of	  integration	  because	  they	  are	  not	  as	  heavily	  dependent	  economically	  and	  politically	  on	  ‘big	  brother’	  Russia	  as	  most	  other	  post	  soviet	  states,	  especially	  those	  in	  Central	  Asia.	  The	  states	  that	  comprise	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union	  vary	  in	  their	  importance	  to	  Moscow,	  and	  so	  it	  is	  erroneous	  to	  say	  that	  the	  CIS	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  the	  top	  priority	  of	  Russian	  politicians.	  Rather	  there	  are	  certain	  states	  that	  are	  a	  part	  of	  the	  CIS	  that	  are	  imperative	  to	  Russian	  foreign	  policy,	  and	  there	  are	  others	  that	  factor	  less	  into	  Russia’s	  primary	  interests	  as	  a	  global	  power	  (Lo	  p.79).	  Russia	  sees	  Ukraine	  as	  its	  most	  important	  Slavic	  brother	  country,	  and	  the	  vital	  asset	  in	  the	  CIS.	  As	  such,	  Russia	  has	  fomented	  separatism	  in	  the	  eastern	  regions	  where	  ethnic	  Russians	  reside.	  Leading	  up	  to	  the	  current	  situation	  in	  Ukraine,	  Russia	  distributed	  passports	  widely	  to	  those	  in	  Crimea,	  where	  there	  is	  a	  Russian	  military	  base	  in	  Sevastopol.	  This	  influence	  largely	  contributed	  to	  former	  Ukrainian	  President	  Yanukovich’s	  renunciation	  of	  the	  aim	  of	  NATO	  membership,	  which	  his	  predecessor	  former	  President	  Yushchenko	  saw	  as	  an	  important	  step	  to	  integration	  with	  the	  west	  (Oldberg	  p.43).	  Former	  President	  Yanukovich	  was	  recently	  ousted	  by	  the	  highly	  publicized	  “Euromaidan”	  protests	  by	  pro-­‐European	  leaning	  activists.	  His	  leadership	  led	  Ukraine	  to	  the	  brink	  of	  a	  civil	  war,	  pitting	  European-­‐leaning	  Ukrainians	  in	  Kiev	  and	  the	  West	  against	  Russian-­‐leaning	  Ukrainians	  in	  the	  Eastern	  provinces	  (Washington	  Post).	  	  	  
Ukraine	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  buffer	  zone	  between	  Russia	  and	  the	  west	  with	  its	  sizable	  population	  and	  large	  territory.	  Ukraine	  owes	  Russia	  over	  a	  billion	  US	  dollars	  and	  this	  is	  also	  a	  cause	  of	  Russian	  concern	  and	  gives	  the	  Russian	  elite	  leverage	  in	  Ukrainian	  decision	  making.	  It	  is	  a	  conduit	  for	  Russian	  natural	  gas	  and	  crude	  oil	  to	  Europe,	  its	  largest	  importer,	  and	  is	  culturally	  significant.	  Russian	  ties	  with	  Ukraine	  go	  back	  further	  than	  any	  other	  Soviet	  republic,	  Kiev	  being	  the	  ancient	  capitol	  for	  the	  Duchy	  of	  Rus’	  founded	  in	  the	  800’s.	  Russia	  holds	  strong	  economic,	  political,	  and	  historical	  ties,	  having	  been	  united	  with	  Ukraine	  for	  300	  years.	  Ukraine	  is	  by	  many	  considered	  part	  of	  Russia	  and	  has	  supplied	  many	  Russian	  leaders,	  including	  Khrushchev	  and	  Brezhnev.	  	  Belarus	  is	  an	  ideological	  and	  cultural	  integration	  concern	  for	  Russia.	  The	  Russian	  and	  Belarusian	  governments	  share	  some	  ideological	  similarities.	  Authoritarian,	  cult-­‐like	  leaders	  lead	  both	  Belarus	  and	  Russia:	  President	  Lukashenko	  and	  President	  Vladimir	  Putin	  respectively.	  Both	  governments	  have	  been	  talking	  of	  a	  union	  since	  the	  breakup	  of	  the	  USSR	  and	  support	  soviet-­‐era	  policies	  that	  enact	  state	  control	  over	  major	  economic	  industries.	  The	  talks	  of	  integration	  are	  disappointing	  to	  some,	  as	  not	  much	  fruition	  has	  come	  of	  discussions	  on	  the	  subject.	  President	  Lukashenko	  is	  an	  autocratic,	  egoistic	  leader	  in	  his	  own	  right	  who	  has	  an	  agenda	  that	  sometimes	  contrasts	  with	  Putin.	  Belarusians	  accuse	  Russia	  of	  pursuing	  the	  idea	  of	  unity	  with	  Belarus	  merely	  to	  secure	  domestic	  popularity.	  Russian	  politicians	  themselves	  have	  said	  that	  there	  is	  no	  rush	  to	  unite	  with	  Belarus,	  as	  it	  will	  always	  be	  there	  when	  unification	  does	  come	  to	  the	  forefront.	  This	  assumption	  has	  led	  to	  tense	  ties	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  
During	  the	  Soviet	  Era,	  each	  republic	  focused	  its	  economy	  on	  producing	  a	  specific	  good	  needed	  to	  sustain	  Soviet	  citizens	  and	  boost	  economic	  production.	  Each	  state	  in	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  to	  meet	  production	  quotas	  of	  certain	  goods	  that	  the	  nation’s	  environment	  or	  infrastructure	  was	  suited	  for.	  Since	  their	  economies	  often	  only	  produced	  goods	  in	  one	  sector	  of	  the	  economy	  (cotton,	  textiles,	  nuclear	  power,	  etc.),	  the	  post-­‐soviet	  governments	  were	  not	  able	  to	  expand	  to	  other	  sectors	  efficiently.	  To	  this	  day	  Russia	  uses	  Ukraine,	  Kazakhstan,	  and	  Georgia	  as	  conduits	  for	  oil	  and	  gas	  pipelines	  to	  sends	  its	  biofuels	  to	  Europe,	  its	  primary	  buyer.	  The	  effects	  of	  this	  system	  can	  still	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  present	  day.	  This	  does	  more	  to	  help	  the	  Russian	  economy	  than	  the	  other	  nations,	  which	  are	  struggling	  make	  profit.	  Therefore,	  the	  economies	  of	  the	  former	  U.S.S.R.,	  especially	  the	  Caucasus	  and	  Central	  Asia	  are	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  Russia	  for	  trade	  and	  resources.	  	  Both	  of	  these	  regions	  are	  seen	  as	  those	  that	  could	  threaten	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  CIS.	  In	  the	  Caucasus,	  the	  Russo-­‐Georgian	  war,	  the	  war	  in	  Chechnya,	  and	  the	  longstanding	  conflict	  between	  Armenia	  and	  Azerbaijan	  disrupted	  the	  flow	  of	  goods	  from	  Russia	  to	  Europe	  and	  other	  post	  soviet	  states,	  which	  created	  a	  major	  concern	  for	  Russia.	  	  The	  Russo-­‐Georgian	  war	  in	  particular	  led	  the	  West	  to	  heavily	  criticize	  Russia	  and	  question	  its	  intentions	  as	  a	  democratic	  and	  modernizing	  government.	  This	  conflict	  led	  to	  the	  strained	  relations	  with	  the	  West	  that	  have	  recently	  become	  even	  more	  stained	  with	  the	  illegal	  annexation	  of	  Crimea	  and	  rebel	  uprisings	  in	  Eastern	  Ukraine.	  	  Russia	  views	  Central	  Asia	  as	  an	  Islamic	  extremist	  threat	  spread	  from	  Afghanistan.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  mention	  that	  Russia	  has	  at	  times	  considered	  the	  
practice	  of	  Islam	  itself,	  extremism.	  Currently,	  the	  majority	  of	  Central	  Asia,	  though	  viewing	  itself	  as	  ethnically	  Turkic	  and	  culturally	  Muslim,	  is	  secularized	  from	  soviet	  practice.	  Russia	  views	  the	  majority	  Muslim	  nations	  as	  a	  possible	  threat	  because	  of	  the	  fear	  of	  pan-­‐Islamism	  and	  pan-­‐Turkism	  tendencies	  that	  could	  strengthen	  this	  region’s	  ties	  with	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  thus	  threaten	  the	  Former	  Soviet	  space,	  especially	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  CIS.	  	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  governments	  of	  the	  post	  soviet	  space	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  ideological	  socialization	  known	  as	  strategic	  culture.	  According	  to	  David	  R.	  Jones,	  there	  are	  three	  levels	  of	  social	  influence	  that	  combine	  to	  create	  strategic	  culture.	  The	  
Macro-­‐level,	  (founding	  of	  the	  people)	  encompasses	  geography,	  history	  and	  ethnology.	  The	  Meso-­‐Level,	  (modern	  day	  circumstances)	  consists	  of	  the	  current	  political,	  economic,	  social	  and	  ideological	  structure	  of	  the	  society.	  The	  Micro-­‐Level,	  includes	  military	  institutions	  and	  civil	  military	  relations	  (Jones	  p.35).	  	  Simply	  put,	  the	  three	  levels	  of	  influence	  are	  the	  society’s	  history,	  culture,	  and	  military.	  	  For	  Russia,	  the	  political	  culture	  (Meso-­‐level),	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  President	  Putin	  establishes	  policies	  of	  authoritarianism,	  state	  strength,	  capitalism,	  and	  great	  power	  status.	  The	  consequence	  for	  the	  post	  soviet	  space	  is	  Russia’s	  use	  of	  its	  military	  strength,	  environmental	  resources,	  lack	  of	  natural	  barriers,	  and	  large	  population	  to	  exert	  cultural	  and	  political	  influence	  on	  the	  countries	  that	  used	  to	  be	  part	  of	  its	  union	  (Skak	  p.141).	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  this	  influence,	  Russia	  offers	  its	  goods	  at	  prices	  that	  compete	  with	  Chinese	  goods	  and	  “gives	  generous	  loans	  to	  governments,	  provides	  credit	  for	  large	  development	  projects,	  takes	  part	  in	  constructing	  hydroelectric	  stations,	  mines,	  pipelines,	  and	  so	  on”	  (Rukavishnikov	  
p.82).	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  its	  former	  republics,	  Russia	  is	  an	  “energy	  super-­‐power”	  as	  it	  supplies	  electricity,	  gas,	  and	  crude	  oil	  to	  its	  neighbors	  and	  Europe.	  Dmitry	  Medvedev	  said	  himself	  in	  2008	  that	  it	  views	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  as	  a	  “zone	  of	  Russian	  responsibility	  and	  interests”(Rukavishnikov	  p.83).	  	  The	  CIS	  (Commonwealth	  of	  Independent	  States)	  is	  a	  major	  means	  for	  Russia	  to	  assert	  its	  influence	  in	  the	  post	  soviet	  space,	  and	  has	  been	  considered	  a	  critical	  pillar	  of	  Russian	  foreign	  policy	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  world’s	  notion	  of	  Russia	  as	  a	  super	  power	  (Lo	  p.22).	  	  The	  attitudes	  of	  some	  elites	  contradict	  this	  however.	  In	  the	  international	  arena	  the	  government	  wishes	  to	  be	  viewed	  primarily	  as	  European,	  as	  opposed	  to	  Slavic	  or	  Eurasian,	  meaning	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  CIS	  states	  are	  subordinate	  to	  those	  of	  EU	  states.	  Russia	  has	  a	  conflicting	  and	  ill-­‐defined	  policy	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  regional	  interests	  because	  the	  government	  wants	  to	  appear	  obeisant	  to	  EU	  demands,	  however	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  governmental	  body	  is	  merely	  grudgingly	  western-­‐centric	  (Lo	  p.22).	  Closer	  ties	  with	  Western	  Europe	  would	  give	  Russia	  more	  legitimacy	  and	  provide	  political	  and	  economic	  security	  and	  advantages,	  which	  the	  government	  seeks,	  but	  elites	  are	  not	  dedicated	  to	  honestly	  cultivating	  this	  relationship.	  President	  Putin	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  Medvedev	  have	  pursued	  policies	  that	  attempt	  to	  placate	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Western	  Europe,	  but	  the	  former	  Soviet	  space	  is	  where	  Russia	  allocates	  most	  of	  its	  resources,	  both	  economic	  and	  military.	  	  	  	  	  	  
European	  Union:	  To	  Modernize	  or	  to	  Westernize?	  	   Russian	  relations	  with	  the	  European	  Union	  focus	  on	  two	  main	  objectives.	  These	  are	  economic	  integration	  and	  modernization,	  and	  political	  democratization	  and	  westernization.	  The	  general	  perspective	  of	  scholars	  coincides	  with	  what	  Dmitry	  Trenin	  outlines	  in	  a	  speech	  regarding	  a	  recently	  published	  book	  on	  Russian	  foreign	  policy.	  He	  says,	  “Russian	  foreign	  policy	  should	  focus	  not	  on	  enhancing	  Russia’s	  status	  as	  a	  great	  power	  but	  on	  tapping	  external	  resources	  to	  facilitate	  the	  country’s	  modernization.	  This	  means	  relying	  on	  instruments	  of	  “soft	  power”	  and	  seeking	  to	  integrate	  with	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU)”	  (Trenin	  p.8).	  Academics	  believe	  that	  Russia,	  particularly	  under	  Putin’s	  administration,	  has	  resorted	  back	  to	  cold	  war	  tactics	  in	  its	  approach	  to	  foreign	  policy.	  Russian	  leadership	  is	  adamant	  in	  fortifying	  itself	  as	  a	  global	  superpower	  through	  its	  interactions	  with	  the	  “near	  abroad”	  and	  its	  positions	  in	  international	  organizations,	  particularly	  the	  Security	  Council	  of	  the	  UN	  (United	  Nations).	  	  	  	   After	  the	  “thaw”	  during	  the	  Gorbachev	  era,	  and	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  warming	  global	  ties	  with	  the	  west	  under	  former	  President	  Yeltsin,	  President	  Putin’s	  rise	  to	  power	  led	  to	  a	  return	  to	  strained	  relations	  between	  Russia	  and	  the	  United	  States	  due	  to	  his	  military	  aggression.	  President	  Putin	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  powerful	  egoistic	  leader	  who	  was	  able	  to	  create	  a	  sense	  of	  stability	  and	  economic	  recovery.	  President	  Putin’s	  promise	  to	  restore	  Russia	  to	  prominence	  through	  hard	  power	  politics	  is	  popular	  at	  home	  because	  it	  distracts	  the	  citizens	  from	  focusing	  on	  the	  existing	  domestic	  issues.	  These	  include	  corruption,	  inflation,	  persecution,	  
sanctions,	  lack	  of	  economic	  diversity,	  a	  dated	  infrastructure,	  and	  human	  rights	  violations	  (Congressional	  Research	  Service:	  Russian	  Political,	  Economic,	  and	  Security	  
Issues	  and	  U.S.	  Interests,	  pg.	  13-­‐35).	  The	  Sochi	  Olympics	  is	  a	  grand	  example	  of	  Putin’s	  effort	  to	  build	  up	  a	  golden-­‐age	  image	  of	  Russia	  to	  show	  off	  to	  the	  west.	  	  Russia’s	  ambition	  to	  gain	  parity	  with	  the	  west	  lies	  in	  its	  dependence	  on	  hard	  power	  and	  regional	  eminence.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  sincerity	  of	  the	  Russian	  elite	  towards	  warm	  relations	  with	  the	  west	  is	  legitimately	  questionable.	  Russians	  faced	  frustration	  that	  their	  country	  was	  not	  able	  to	  recover	  from	  the	  soviet	  period	  as	  well	  as	  expected.	  With	  the	  gift	  of	  hindsight,	  researchers	  are	  able	  to	  see	  that	  the	  difficulties	  Russia	  faced	  after	  the	  USSR	  disintegrated	  were	  immense.	  	  Russia’s	  outdated	  infrastructure,	  endemic	  corruption,	  extreme	  poverty,	  and	  lack	  of	  outlets	  for	  the	  citizens	  to	  communicate	  effectively	  with	  their	  government,	  meant	  that	  there	  was	  no	  way	  Russia	  would	  be	  able	  to	  quickly	  reemerge	  as	  the	  once	  great	  super-­‐power	  it	  had	  previously	  been.	  	  Despite	  disagreements	  between	  Russia	  and	  Europe,	  Russia	  sees	  itself	  as	  a	  European	  nation	  that	  has	  played	  an	  integral	  part	  in	  many	  major	  turning	  points	  in	  history.	  Be	  it	  the	  defeat	  of	  the	  Napoleonic	  Empire,	  forming	  the	  Entente	  alliance	  in	  WWI,	  or	  the	  defeat	  of	  the	  Nazi	  regime	  in	  WWII,	  Russia	  has	  played	  a	  large	  part	  in	  forming	  Europe	  into	  what	  we	  know	  it	  as	  today	  (Ivanov	  p.93).	  	  Russia	  views	  itself	  as	  a	  fundamental	  actor	  in	  pan-­‐European	  security	  and	  cooperation.	  According	  to	  Former	  Russian	  Foreign	  Minister	  Igor	  Ivanov,	  Russia	  seeks	  to	  integrate	  and	  conform	  to	  a	  market	  economy	  modeled	  after	  nations	  in	  the	  European	  Union,	  as	  well	  as	  
building	  a	  democratic	  government	  that	  conforms	  to	  European	  ideals	  of	  fair	  election,	  public	  trials	  and	  human	  rights	  (Ivanov	  pg.103).	  	  Russia	  believes	  that	  Europe’s	  intentions	  to	  unify	  itself	  into	  a	  super-­‐power	  and	  integrate	  Russia	  without	  allowing	  its	  entrance	  into	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  NATO	  into	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Former	  Soviet	  Union	  will	  isolate	  Russia,	  and	  creates	  fault	  lines	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  divisions	  in	  Europe	  that	  would	  harm	  its	  security	  (Romanova	  p.75).	  Russia	  was	  never	  seriously	  considered	  as	  a	  possible	  member	  of	  NATO	  because	  of	  its	  authoritarian	  government	  and	  the	  vastness	  of	  its	  terrain.	  NATO	  itself	  would	  not	  be	  willing	  to	  step	  into	  a	  conflict	  that	  could	  extend	  to	  the	  Russo-­‐Chinese	  border.	  The	  fact	  that	  other	  states	  that	  comprised	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  were	  considered	  or	  invited	  is	  an	  open	  sore	  for	  the	  Russian	  elite.	  Russia	  seeks	  to	  uphold	  its	  security	  through	  international	  organizations,	  which	  include	  the	  CSTO,	  CIS,	  and	  OSCE	  (Organization	  for	  Security	  and	  Co-­‐operation	  in	  Europe),	  with	  which	  Russia	  competes	  with	  NATO	  and	  the	  EU.	  Medvedev	  tried	  to	  create	  new	  security	  organizations	  that	  incorporated	  Russia	  with	  Europe	  with	  his	  own	  “Fourteen	  Points”	  proposal	  in	  2008,	  which	  led	  to	  a	  series	  of	  discussions	  in	  2009	  that	  incorporated	  analysts,	  politicians,	  officials,	  and	  Eurasian	  specialists	  (Lomagin	  p.181).	  Ultimately,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  proposition	  heavily	  reinforced	  Russian	  power	  and	  dominance.	  European	  officials	  read	  the	  Russian	  rhetoric	  as	  potentially	  threatening	  to	  their	  national	  interests,	  and	  so	  the	  initiatives	  were	  not	  readily	  adopted	  (Lomagin	  p.181).	  	  Russia’s	  intervention	  in	  Georgia,	  Chechnya,	  Ukraine,	  and	  the	  Armenian-­‐Azerbaijani	  conflict	  are	  all	  examples	  of	  its	  ambition	  to	  keep	  itself	  and	  the	  lands	  it	  views	  as	  its	  ‘near	  abroad’	  secure.	  
Russia’s	  concern	  for	  its	  diaspora	  may	  be	  the	  publically	  stated	  intention	  for	  its	  intervention,	  but	  behind	  this	  statement	  lie	  other	  concerns.	  Russia	  wants	  the	  world	  to	  view	  its	  former	  republics	  as	  stable,	  and	  feels	  an	  obligation	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  areas	  with	  which	  it	  was	  once	  unified,	  especially	  where	  economic	  interests	  are	  involved,	  as	  it	  was	  in	  the	  cases	  mentioned.	  	  The	  question	  posed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  section	  asks	  if	  Russia	  should	  spend	  its	  efforts	  attempting	  to	  westernize	  its	  government	  and	  economy	  or	  find	  another	  model	  to	  modernize.	  Russia	  itself	  faces	  an	  identity	  crisis	  that	  it	  tries	  to	  assuage	  through	  increased	  communications	  and	  economic	  integration	  with	  Europe	  while	  maintaining	  friendly	  ties	  with	  China.	  Should	  Russia	  attempt	  to	  attach	  itself	  to	  a	  western	  fate,	  or	  should	  it	  aim	  to	  be	  among	  the	  rising	  Asian	  super	  powers?	  The	  authoritarian	  style	  government	  of	  Russia	  means	  that	  it	  shares	  values	  and	  ideals	  with	  Asian	  powerhouse	  China,	  but	  Russia	  has	  always	  sought	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  European,	  which	  it	  sees	  as	  the	  ultimate	  ‘culture’.	  	  	   In	  order	  to	  mediate	  relations	  with	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  strengthen	  ties	  with	  Europe,	  Russia	  must	  gain	  full	  recognition	  for	  its	  market	  economy	  by	  western	  states.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  the	  Russian	  government	  must	  work	  with	  the	  EU.	  Europe	  must	  make	  its	  market	  more	  accessible	  to	  Russian	  goods	  and	  services	  and	  reconstruct	  trade	  policies	  that	  look	  more	  favorably	  upon	  Russia.	  This	  will	  be	  a	  difficult,	  lengthy	  transition,	  but	  it	  is	  possible	  if	  the	  Russian	  elites	  align	  themselves	  with	  EU	  policies	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  strive	  for	  a	  more	  democratic	  government	  (Ivanov	  p.147).	  However,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  Russian	  government	  amending	  its	  structure	  and	  becoming	  more	  democratic	  in	  the	  near	  future	  is	  chiefly	  a	  pipe	  dream.	  
Russia	  needs	  to	  expand	  political	  dialogue	  with	  the	  EU	  and	  work	  together	  with	  the	  organization	  to	  develop	  a	  pan-­‐European	  structure	  for	  cooperation.	  Economic	  legislation	  and	  technical	  standards	  in	  Russia	  lag	  behind	  those	  of	  the	  EU,	  and	  closing	  this	  gap	  as	  well	  as	  increasing	  cooperation	  with	  the	  EU	  regarding	  science	  and	  technology	  would	  benefit	  both	  regions	  (Ivanov	  p.103).	  	  	  Wiegand	  elucidates	  the	  difficulties	  in	  the	  Russian-­‐EU	  relationship,	  saying;	  “Relations	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  Russia	  are	  going	  through	  a	  particularly	  complex	  phase	  at	  present.	  As	  the	  EU	  expands	  closer	  to	  the	  Russian	  heartland,	  the	  paradoxes	  that	  characterize	  the	  EU-­‐Russian	  relationship	  become	  more	  pronounced”	  (Wiegand	  p.9).	  He	  expands	  on	  this	  by	  explaining	  that	  investment	  and	  trade	  in	  Russia	  are	  burgeoning	  industries,	  and	  although	  the	  EU	  wishes	  to	  capitalize	  on	  and	  integrate	  itself	  with	  this	  development,	  its	  western	  orientation	  propagates	  its	  concerns	  with	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  issues	  in	  Russia.	  Europe	  is	  enthusiastic	  about	  Russia	  acting	  as	  a	  partner	  to	  help	  resolve	  international	  conflict,	  however,	  makes	  known	  its	  concern	  for	  the	  rhetoric	  and	  direction	  of	  Russia’s	  foreign	  policy.	  Russia	  was	  always	  skeptical	  of	  EU	  enlargement	  but	  is	  now	  professedly	  adamantly	  against	  it	  (Wiegand	  p.9).	  The	  EU	  and	  the	  Russian	  Federation	  are	  both	  relatively	  new	  actors	  in	  the	  global	  sphere	  and	  are	  still	  developing	  their	  foreign	  policy	  objectives	  and	  personalities.	  Neither	  body	  has	  fully	  conceptualized	  their	  relationship.	  Henceforth,	  it	  is	  in	  state	  of	  complexity	  brought	  on	  by	  economic	  exchange	  and	  ideological	  differences	  (Debardeleben	  p.418).	  	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  which	  direction	  Russia	  will	  follow	  with	  its	  relations	  with	  the	  EU	  and	  Europe,	  but	  great	  power	  politics	  is	  sure	  to	  come	  into	  play.	  Russia	  has	  a	  variety	  of	  economic,	  political,	  and	  cultural	  reasons	  for	  wishing	  to	  
further	  integrate	  with	  Europe,	  but	  in	  order	  for	  this	  to	  happen,	  compromise	  and	  honest	  dialogue	  will	  be	  necessary	  on	  both	  sides.	  	  	  United	  States:	  Not	  Enemy,	  Not	  Ally,	  Not	  Equal	  	   	   Russian	  relations	  with	  the	  United	  States	  feature	  ideological,	  geopolitical,	  and	  economic	  competition.	  Negotiations	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  have	  always	  had	  a	  powerful	  impact	  on	  world	  events.	  During	  the	  Soviet	  period	  Russia	  and	  the	  US	  were	  traditional	  enemies,	  pitting	  communism	  against	  capitalism.	  This	  ideological	  clash	  illustrates	  the	  ancient	  conflict	  between	  east	  and	  west.	  Both	  nations	  have	  a	  great	  power	  ideology	  and	  nationalistic	  impulses.	  When	  the	  USSR	  dissolved	  in	  the	  early	  1990’s,	  the	  United	  States	  extended	  friendly	  relations	  towards	  Russia	  and	  the	  other	  former	  republics	  in	  hopes	  of	  expanding	  democracy	  and	  market	  economies	  eastward.	  This	  would	  have	  meant	  a	  stronger	  European	  alliance	  and	  would	  have	  signaled	  that	  the	  west	  ‘won’	  the	  Cold	  War,	  that	  communism	  failed,	  and	  that	  democracy	  would	  seize	  the	  day.	  	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Russian	  governments	  expanded	  dialogue	  and	  sought	  to	  integrate	  and	  modernize	  the	  Russian	  economy	  to	  the	  standards	  of	  Western	  Europe	  and	  reconstruct	  the	  crony	  authoritarian	  government.	  The	  first	  step	  that	  made	  this	  possible	  was	  former	  Russian	  President	  Brezhnev’s	  policies	  of	  Glasnost	  and	  Perestroika	  in	  the	  1980’s	  right	  before	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  These	  policies	  initiated	  openness	  and	  economic	  restructuring	  that	  allowed	  for	  more	  contact	  with	  the	  west	  (Bruno,	  U.S.-­‐Russia	  Arms	  Control).	  Western	  integration	  became	  a	  goal	  under	  
the	  leadership	  of	  Russian	  President	  Yeltsin	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  1990’s.	  These	  were	  ambitious	  hopes,	  and	  in	  the	  2000’s	  leaders	  from	  Russia	  and	  the	  United	  States	  started	  to	  resent	  each	  other	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  wars	  in	  Chechnya	  and	  Georgia,	  and	  the	  competition	  for	  oil	  and	  natural	  gas	  reserves	  in	  Central	  Asia.	  	   	  The	  U.S.	  believed	  that	  Russia	  was	  headed	  down	  its	  traditional	  path	  of	  military	  force,	  resource	  exploitation,	  and	  regional	  dominance	  to	  keep	  hold	  of	  the	  former	  soviet	  republics	  instead	  of	  preoccupying	  itself	  with	  settling	  domestic	  disputes.	  Russia	  felt	  threatened	  by	  the	  United	  States	  competing	  politically	  and	  economically	  in	  Russia’s	  traditional	  sphere	  of	  influence	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  and	  Central	  Asia,	  which	  Russia	  deems	  its	  ‘near	  abroad’	  (Kanet	  p.	  213).	  Russian	  leaders	  were	  offended	  that	  US	  policy	  towards	  Russia	  was	  that	  of	  a	  victor	  of	  the	  cold	  war.	  The	  Russians	  view	  American	  investment	  in	  natural	  resources	  in	  Central	  Asia	  and	  the	  Caucasus	  as	  coercive,	  imposing,	  and	  exploitative	  of	  the	  former	  soviet	  republics	  (Kanet	  p.213).	  President	  Putin	  claims	  that	  “The	  United	  States	  has	  overstepped	  its	  borders	  in	  all	  spheres	  –	  economic,	  political,	  and	  humanitarian	  –	  and	  has	  imposed	  itself	  on	  others…One-­‐sided	  illegitimate	  action	  hasn’t	  solved	  a	  single	  problem	  and	  has	  become	  a	  generator	  of	  many	  human	  tragedies,	  a	  source	  of	  tension”	  (Putin,	  Munich	  2007).	  The	  challenge	  to	  Russian	  profit	  from	  pipelines,	  overpriced	  goods	  and	  exorbitant	  fees	  causes	  great	  concern	  for	  the	  incumbent	  government.	  Russia	  finds	  the	  American	  perception	  of	  U.S.	  importance	  and	  primacy	  in	  these	  regions	  as	  insulting,	  as	  these	  areas	  were	  traditionally	  dominated	  by	  Russian	  culture	  and	  politics	  (Ivanov	  p.112).	  	  Defense	  policy	  and	  security	  is	  an	  important	  means	  of	  bilateral	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  Both	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Russia	  have	  a	  history	  of	  a	  
strong	  military,	  and	  defense	  and	  national	  security	  are	  both	  countries’	  top	  priorities	  in	  foreign	  policy.	  	  In	  order	  for	  these	  efforts	  to	  lead	  to	  mutual	  support,	  careful	  rhetoric	  and	  constant	  dialogue	  must	  be	  maintained	  in	  order	  to	  curtail	  the	  possible	  continuation	  of	  enmity	  between	  east	  and	  west	  (Hydeprice	  p.185).	  Russia	  and	  the	  U.S.	  agree	  upon	  the	  importance	  of	  nuclear	  nonproliferation,	  having	  both	  signed	  the	  Limited	  Test	  Ban	  Treaty,	  Nuclear	  Non-­‐Proliferation	  Treaty,	  Strategic	  Arms	  Limitation	  Treaty,	  Anti	  Ballistics	  Missile	  Treaty,	  and	  numerous	  others	  (Bruno,	  U.S.-­‐
Russia	  Arms	  Control).	  The	  nuclear	  capabilities	  of	  both	  countries	  have	  been	  reduced	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  cold	  war	  made	  such	  large	  and	  destructive	  arsenals	  anachronistic.	  Both	  countries	  are	  concerned	  with	  conflict	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  potential	  chemical	  and	  other	  dangerous	  and	  inhumane	  weapons	  that	  extremist	  groups	  use	  to	  maneuver	  their	  power	  in	  the	  region.	  Although	  Russia	  and	  the	  United	  States	  took	  different	  sides	  in	  the	  Syrian	  conflict,	  with	  the	  US	  siding	  with	  the	  rebels	  and	  the	  Russians	  favoring	  the	  incumbent	  government,	  both	  countries	  are	  passionate	  about	  defeating	  terrorism	  and	  extremism	  in	  any	  capacity	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Europe,	  Asia,	  and	  their	  home	  countries	  respectively.	  	  The	  main	  differences	  in	  their	  policies	  lie	  in	  strategy.	  Whereas	  “The	  United	  States	  stresses	  values	  and	  a	  commitment	  to	  democratic	  development	  as	  a	  key	  dimension	  of	  relations	  with	  Russia	  and	  its	  neighbors.	  Russia	  opposes	  making	  this	  an	  important	  element	  in	  the	  relationship	  and,	  in	  general,	  a	  justification	  for	  active	  intervention	  anywhere”(Legvold	  p.103).	  	  	   Since	  2008,	  relations	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Russia	  began	  to	  sour.	  This	  coincided	  with	  Russia’s	  invasion	  of	  Georgia	  and	  later	  recognition	  of	  Abkhazia	  
and	  South	  Ossetia	  as	  sovereign	  nations.	  Russia	  claimed	  it	  was	  to	  protect	  ethnic	  Russians	  in	  the	  region	  but	  the	  US	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  west	  viewed	  it	  as	  a	  return	  to	  Russian	  imperialism	  and	  authoritarianism.	  The	  United	  States	  government	  believed	  that	  Russia’s	  recognition	  of	  the	  separatist	  regions	  and	  its	  military	  aggression	  in	  Georgia	  was	  pursued	  in	  order	  to	  reinstate	  Russia’s	  super-­‐power	  status.	  The	  United	  States	  pushed	  military	  intervention	  in	  Yugoslavia,	  a	  missile	  defense	  system	  in	  Central	  Europe,	  and	  manipulation	  of	  oil	  and	  gas	  resources	  in	  Central	  Asia,	  all	  to	  contain	  Russian	  influence	  in	  areas	  it	  had	  previously	  dominated,	  causing	  the	  Russian	  government	  to	  feel	  threatened	  (kanet	  p.205).	  	  The	  most	  recent	  example	  of	  this	  took	  place	  in	  Kiev,	  Ukraine	  where	  the	  Євромайдан	  (“Euro-­‐square”)	  protests	  brought	  down	  the	  leadership	  of	  pro-­‐Russian	  president	  Victor	  Yanukovych.	  Citizens	  had	  grown	  increasingly	  weary	  of	  his	  leadership,	  and	  after	  he	  pursued	  a	  policy	  that	  distanced	  Ukraine	  from	  Europe	  and	  the	  people’s	  ambitions	  to	  eventually	  join	  the	  European	  Union,	  mass	  protest	  developed	  into	  a	  full-­‐blown	  revolution	  in	  February	  2014.	  In	  May	  of	  2014,	  the	  people	  of	  Ukraine	  voted	  for	  and	  elected	  Petro	  Poroshenko	  as	  president	  on	  a	  platform	  of	  pro-­‐European	  Union	  leanings.	  	  In	  response,	  Russia	  illegally	  annexed	  Crimea	  and	  supported	  uprisings	  in	  eastern	  regions	  of	  Ukraine	  such	  as	  Donetsk,	  where	  rebels	  seized	  control	  of	  some	  cities,	  carrying	  out	  military	  agendas	  from	  government	  buildings.	  President	  Putin	  said	  that	  there	  were	  sizable	  Russian	  populations	  in	  Eastern	  Ukraine	  that	  carried	  out	  the	  protests	  without	  his	  directive.	  Indeed	  there	  are	  many	  Russians	  in	  Eastern	  Ukraine;	  however,	  President	  Putin	  previously	  fueled	  separatist	  behavior	  in	  South	  
Ossetia,	  Abkhazia	  and	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh.	  In	  light	  of	  this	  fact,	  it	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  that	  he	  again	  wrought	  unrest	  in	  an	  area	  that	  many	  Russians	  consider	  part	  of	  their	  homeland.	  The	  move	  to	  make	  Crimea	  part	  of	  Russia	  and	  urge	  pro-­‐Russian	  sentiment	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  Ukraine	  is	  popular	  at	  home,	  and	  as	  such	  means	  that	  although	  Putin	  is	  increasingly	  seen	  as	  notoriously	  volatile	  by	  the	  west,	  domestically,	  he	  is	  sustaining	  and	  even	  growing	  in	  popularity.	  The	  United	  States	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  west	  fear	  that	  Crimea	  is	  just	  one	  step	  towards	  Putin’s	  larger	  plan	  to	  recapture	  territory	  lost	  after	  the	  break-­‐up	  of	  the	  USSR	  and	  build	  up	  Russia	  once	  again	  to	  an	  antagonist	  superpower.	  It	  does	  not	  seem	  that	  relations	  will	  improve	  in	  the	  near	  future	  if	  Russia	  keeps	  pursuing	  an	  aggressive,	  hard-­‐power	  foreign	  policy,	  but	  the	  two	  nations	  do	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  work	  together	  in	  international	  organizations,	  namely	  the	  UN	  to	  fight	  discord	  and	  terrorism.	  	  	  China:	  The	  Feared	  Ally	  	   Russian	  foreign	  policy	  towards	  China	  incorporates	  appeasement	  and	  admiration.	  After	  decades	  of	  poor	  relations	  during	  the	  Soviet	  Era	  due	  to	  a	  border	  dispute,	  unrest	  in	  the	  Xinjiang	  province,	  and	  communist	  competitiveness,	  Russia	  and	  China	  signed	  the	  Sino-­‐Russian	  Treaty	  on	  Good-­‐Neighborliness,	  Friendship,	  and	  Cooperation	  on	  July	  16,	  2001	  (Wishnick,	  p.797).	  This	  was	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  turn-­‐around	  towards	  a	  positive	  and	  mutually	  beneficial	  partnership,	  which	  western	  politicians	  seem	  to	  treat	  with	  indifference,	  which,	  considering	  China	  has	  overtaken	  the	  United	  States	  as	  the	  largest	  economy	  in	  the	  world	  may	  not	  be	  a	  wise	  decision.	  
Some	  researchers	  “noted	  that	  common	  opposition	  to	  American	  policies	  on	  national	  missile	  defense	  (NMD),	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  (NATO)	  expansion,	  and	  intervention	  in	  the	  Kosovo	  conflict	  served	  to	  shore	  up	  Sino-­‐Russian	  strategic	  coordination	  and	  military	  cooperation,	  despite	  the	  partnership’s	  weakness	  in	  other	  areas”	  (Dobriansky	  p.8).	  The	  two	  governments	  are	  both	  authoritarian	  and	  thus	  tend	  to	  agree	  ideologically	  on	  most	  issues	  despite	  major	  cultural	  differences.	  Russia	  realizes	  that	  China	  realizes	  that	  Central	  Asia	  is	  in	  need	  of	  cheap	  goods	  due	  to	  its	  philandering	  economy	  and	  dependence	  on	  a	  Russia	  that	  benefits	  from	  selling	  goods	  at	  heightened	  prices	  to	  its	  dependents.	  	  China	  views	  Central	  Asia	  as	  an	  alternative	  avenue	  for	  oil	  and	  gas	  pipelines.	  A	  project	  was	  introduced	  in	  2003	  for	  the	  Kazakhstan-­‐China	  Gas	  Pipeline,	  and	  was	  formally	  announced	  in	  2007,	  which	  Uzbekistan	  and	  Turkmenistan	  also	  signed	  (BBC	  Monitoring	  Central	  Asia:	  Turkmen	  Gas	  Deal	  Extends	  Chinese	  
Influence).	  The	  first	  section	  was	  completed	  in	  Kazakhstan	  in	  2009,	  the	  second	  section	  in	  2010,	  and	  the	  third	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  finished	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2014	  (Jabri).	  The	  income	  generated	  by	  the	  project	  has	  led	  to	  investment	  in	  infrastructure	  and	  technological	  improvement	  with	  the	  help	  and	  funding	  of	  the	  Chinese	  government.	  The	  Russian	  response	  has	  been	  to	  “hug	  China	  close…Putin	  has	  given	  very	  clear	  priority	  both	  to	  visiting	  and	  staying	  in	  touch	  with	  the	  Chinese	  leadership.	  [Russians]	  see	  China	  as	  an	  important	  counterbalance	  to	  their	  estrangement	  from	  the	  West,	  a	  fast-­‐growing	  trade	  partner,	  and	  their	  friendship	  as	  diminishing	  the	  likelihood	  of	  challenge	  to	  Russian	  sovereignty	  in	  the	  Far	  East”	  (Brenton	  p.231).	  Some	  Russian	  
elites	  believe	  that	  “China	  is	  also	  an	  attractive	  model	  of	  ‘authoritarian	  modernization’	  with	  lessons	  to	  teach	  Russia”	  (Brenton	  p.231).	  	  Russia	  also	  understands	  that	  China	  is	  a	  much	  stronger	  state	  with	  the	  world’s	  largest	  economy,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  unwise	  to	  make	  enemies	  of	  the	  Chinese.	  Instead,	  the	  Russian	  government	  attempts	  to	  work	  with	  China	  on	  energy	  and	  technology	  initiatives,	  and	  maintain	  friendly	  relations	  with	  its	  financially	  superior	  neighbor.	  Asian	  states	  in	  general	  were	  quick	  to	  adapt	  to	  modern	  trends	  (Lo	  p.121).	  	  The	  Chinese	  economy	  has	  developed	  at	  an	  unprecedented	  rate	  since	  the	  economic	  reforms	  in	  1978	  while	  also	  preserving	  regional	  security	  though	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  the	  largest	  army	  in	  the	  world	  and	  the	  world’s	  second	  largest	  defense	  budget	  (Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress:	  Military	  and	  Security	  Developments	  Involving	  the	  People's	  
Republic	  of	  China).	  Russia	  seeks	  to	  ensure	  the	  security	  of	  its	  eastern	  border	  with	  China,	  and	  has	  settled	  disputes	  with	  China	  over	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  current	  border.	  Both	  Russia	  and	  China	  fear	  extremism	  and	  separatist	  movements	  in	  regions	  of	  their	  interest.	  In	  Central	  Asia,	  they	  have	  both	  supported	  oppressive	  regimes	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  an	  orderly	  government	  that	  would	  support	  their	  policies	  and	  strike	  down	  religious	  fervor	  through	  secular	  ideals	  (Bellacqua	  p.235).	  	  “Beijing	  constantly	  reiterates	  its	  opposition	  to	  the	  three	  forces	  (often	  called	  the	  “three	  evils”)	  of	  terrorism,	  separatism,	  and	  extremism.	  Although	  China	  is	  developing	  more	  global	  interests,	  regional	  concerns	  still	  take	  precedence.	  China	  seeks	  stability	  along	  its	  periphery	  to	  maximize	  conditions	  for	  internal	  economic	  growth”	  (Bellacqua	  p.235).	  	  	  
Russia	  and	  China	  are	  less	  concerned	  with	  the	  quality	  of	  life	  for	  the	  people	  of	  the	  region,	  as	  both	  governments	  are	  preoccupied	  with	  how	  they	  can	  exploit	  the	  natural	  resources	  of	  Central	  Asia	  for	  their	  own	  profit.	  Corruption	  in	  Central	  Asia	  means	  that	  China	  and	  Russia	  can	  receive	  large	  payments	  of	  money	  from	  proposals	  to	  build	  up	  infrastructure	  and	  technology	  without	  assuring	  that	  the	  projects	  will	  be	  completed.	  	  The	  Shanghai	  Cooperation	  Organization	  (SCO)	  is	  another	  means	  for	  Russia	  and	  China	  to	  work	  together	  as	  principal	  authorities	  in	  the	  Asian	  region.	  The	  SCO	  is	  a	  Eurasian	  regional	  organization	  that	  includes,	  alongside	  Russia	  and	  China,	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Central	  Asian	  nations	  as	  well.	  The	  organization	  discusses	  political,	  security,	  and	  economic	  issues	  relevant	  to	  the	  member	  nations,	  such	  as	  trade	  and	  counterterrorism	  (Scheineson).	  The	  Russian	  government	  recognizes	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  strength	  and	  superiority	  of	  China	  in	  comparison	  with	  Russia,	  who	  is	  currently	  falling	  into	  a	  recession	  due	  to	  economic	  sanction	  put	  in	  place	  by	  the	  Obama	  administration.	  Russia	  faces	  many	  domestic	  issues,	  including	  endemic	  corruption	  and	  a	  weak,	  although	  centralized	  government	  that	  keeps	  its	  economy	  from	  growing	  at	  a	  pace	  necessary	  to	  gain	  back	  the	  superpower	  legacy	  it	  once	  had.	  Russia	  and	  China	  work	  together	  to	  match	  United	  States	  hegemony.	  Russia	  is	  more	  than	  aware	  that	  China	  is	  the	  next	  world	  superpower,	  and	  is	  aligning	  itself	  prudently,	  as	  Italy	  aligned	  with	  the	  Nazi	  regime	  in	  WWII.	  	  Brenton	  says,	  “that	  there	  is	  one	  fundamental	  issue	  on	  which	  China	  and	  Russia	  are	  as	  one.	  They	  are	  both	  ethnically	  heterogeneous,	  hard	  to	  govern,	  ex-­‐empires	  with	  a	  history	  of	  domestic	  collapse	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  vulnerable	  border	  provinces	  (as	  with	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR,	  and	  China's	  ‘century	  of	  humiliation’).	  Maintenance	  of	  domestic	  control	  and	  territorial	  
integrity	  is	  a	  shared	  core	  obsession”	  (Brenton).	  	  As	  such	  China	  and	  Russia	  share	  some	  core	  anxieties	  that	  threaten	  the	  stability	  of	  their	  respective	  countries	  and	  regions,	  and	  this	  brings	  them	  together,	  despite	  a	  long	  fraught	  border	  conflict	  throughout	  the	  1950’s	  and	  1960’s	  that	  was	  resolved	  in	  2008	  (Xinhua).	  	  	  Conclusion	  	   Russian	  relations	  with	  the	  EU,	  US,	  China,	  and	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union	  are	  complex	  and	  often	  incorporate	  conflicting	  and	  confusing	  policies.	  The	  government	  is	  in	  the	  process	  of	  discovering	  its	  identity	  and	  abilities	  in	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  period.	  Russia	  seeks	  to	  integrate	  with	  Europe	  economically	  and	  politically,	  but	  its	  actions	  in	  former	  Soviet	  republics,	  especially	  Georgia	  and	  Ukraine,	  are	  contradictory	  with	  this	  notion.	  Russia	  uses	  hard	  power	  in	  a	  region	  it	  still	  views	  as	  its	  primary	  sphere	  of	  influence,	  and	  this	  form	  of	  muscle	  flexing	  is	  concerning	  and	  off-­‐putting	  for	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  US	  and	  Russia	  have	  a	  tense	  relationship	  that	  warmed	  briefly	  in	  the	  decade	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR,	  but	  grew	  cold	  once	  again	  after	  the	  Russo-­‐Georgian	  war.	  	  Both	  countries	  compete	  for	  influence	  and	  resources	  in	  Central	  Asia	  and	  the	  Caucasus,	  and	  Russia	  sees	  the	  United	  States	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  its	  interests	  in	  the	  CIS.	  	  The	  states	  of	  the	  Former	  Soviet	  Union	  are	  largely	  heavily	  reliant	  of	  Russia	  for	  trade	  and	  policymaking,	  and	  culturally	  are	  still	  developing	  their	  own	  identity.	  The	  states	  vary	  in	  their	  importance	  to	  Russia	  for	  political,	  economic	  and	  historical	  reasons.	  Ukraine	  is	  Russia’s	  foremost	  concern,	  followed	  by	  states	  with	  vast	  amounts	  

























Nagorno-­‐Karabakh:	  Russian	  Influence	  in	  an	  Armenian-­‐Azerbaijani	  
Conflict	  
	  
	  The	  case	  study	  on	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  will	  outline	  the	  reasons	  that	  led	  to	  Russia’s	  military	  involvement	  alongside	  of	  the	  Armenians	  and	  its	  significance	  in	  the	  negotiations	  concerning	  the	  conflict.	  These	  include	  economic	  security,	  undermining	  western	  investment,	  and	  exhibiting	  hard	  power	  to	  maintain	  its	  political	  prominence	  in	  the	  Caucasus.	  The	  chapter	  starts	  with	  a	  discussion	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  Russian	  involvement	  in	  the	  conflict	  and	  a	  historical	  overview	  that	  give	  the	  reader	  a	  premise	  of	  how	  to	  interpret	  Russia’s	  foreign	  policy	  motives	  in	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh.	  The	  significance	  of	  ethnic-­‐religious	  differences	  between	  the	  Muslim	  Azerbaijani’s	  and	  Eastern	  Orthodox	  Armenians	  and	  Russians	  will	  be	  discussed	  as	  a	  relevant	  reason	  for	  Russian	  aid	  to	  the	  weaker	  Armenian	  state.	  Russian	  interests	  and	  international	  negotiations	  will	  be	  then	  be	  discussed	  in	  detail.	  The	  conclusion	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  ineffective	  handling	  of	  the	  peace	  negotiations	  and	  Russia’s	  view	  of	  Azerbaijan	  as	  a	  regional	  economic	  competitor	  and	  what	  this	  means	  for	  Azerbaijan’s	  future	  and	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  conflict.	   	  	  
	  Russian	  Involvement	  in	  Azerbaijan	   	  	   Not	  long	  before	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  “On	  the	  night	  of	  January	  19,	  1990,	  26,000	  Soviet	  troops	  invaded	  the	  capital	  city	  of	  Baku	  and	  surrounding	  areas.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  next	  day,	  more	  than	  130	  people	  had	  died,	  611	  were	  injured,	  841	  were	  arrested	  and	  5	  were	  missing”	  (Bordallo	  p.90).	  This	  event	  became	  known	  as	  "Black	  January,"	  and	  has	  left	  a	  permanent	  mark	  of	  dislike	  and	  distrust	  of	  Russia	  on	  
the	  part	  of	  Azerbaijani	  citizens.	  Azerbaijan	  views	  this	  event	  as	  a	  precursor	  to	  Russian	  involvement	  in	  the	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  conflict,	  in	  which	  it	  took	  the	  side	  of	  ethnic	  Armenians.	  	  Although	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  Russia’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  conflict	  was	  diplomatic,	  mainly	  facilitating	  and	  procrastinating	  negotiations	  via	  the	  Minsk	  Group.	  Many	  analysts,	  including	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  believe	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  Russian	  ground	  forces	  participated	  in	  the	  conflict	  on	  the	  side	  of	  ethnic	  Armenians.	  The	  Azerbaijani	  government	  has	  accused	  Russia	  of	  using	  local	  troops	  in	  the	  366th	  Motorized	  Rifle	  Regiment	  to	  assist	  in	  the	  Khojaly	  massacre,	  which	  killed	  hundreds	  of	  ethnic	  Azerbaijanis,	  as	  well	  as	  fueling	  allegations	  of	  Russian	  troops	  volunteering	  to	  aid	  the	  Armenians	  or	  supplementing	  them	  as	  mercenaries	  (Smolowe	  p.38).	  Russian	  troops	  were	  also	  active	  in	  the	  major	  battles	  of	  Shusha,	  Stepanakert,	  and	  Kelbajar	  (Croissant	  p.87).	  	  	   Russia	  and	  the	  West	  both	  view	  Azerbaijan	  as	  a	  beacon	  of	  natural	  resources	  that	  can	  be	  exploited	  for	  their	  own	  benefit.	  As	  a	  neighbor	  to	  Georgia	  and	  lying	  just	  south	  of	  the	  volatile	  Dagestan	  region	  in	  the	  Northern	  Caucasus,	  Azerbaijan	  is	  no	  stranger	  to	  conflict.	  Azerbaijan	  is	  comprised	  of	  a	  majority	  of	  Turkic	  Muslims,	  which	  has	  been	  a	  source	  of	  estrangement	  and	  tension	  between	  the	  natives	  of	  the	  region	  and	  the	  Russian	  incumbents	  that	  controlled	  Azerbaijan	  during	  the	  Soviet	  Era.	  With	  significant	  minorities	  of	  ethnic	  Russians	  and	  Orthodox	  Armenians,	  both	  Russia	  and	  Armenia	  have	  claims	  on	  the	  land	  to	  protect	  their	  ethnic	  brethren.	  Russian	  interest	  in	  Azerbaijan	  is	  mainly	  focused	  on	  its	  interests	  in	  the	  oil	  and	  natural	  gas	  sector.	  Russia	  itself	  is	  a	  large	  producer	  of	  these	  natural	  resources	  and	  sees	  Azerbaijan	  as	  a	  
threatening	  competitor	  for	  economic	  profit.	  Azerbaijan	  borders	  the	  Caspian	  Sea	  and	  has	  ample	  reserves	  of	  natural	  resources	  on	  its	  coastline.	  Naturally,	  the	  Russian	  government	  aims	  to	  turn	  this	  Azerbaijan’s	  advantage	  into	  its	  own	  gain	  through	  controlling	  trade,	  regulating	  oil	  and	  gas	  prices,	  and	  emanating	  its	  political	  clout	  in	  the	  region.	  	  Various	  Azerbaijani	  leaders	  have	  attempted	  to	  balance	  the	  scales	  of	  its	  foreign	  policy;	  appeasing	  Russia’s	  aggressive	  resource	  interests	  with	  the	  potentially	  beneficial	  interest	  of	  Western	  oil	  companies	  who	  promise	  aid	  and	  investment.	  Azerbaijan’s	  geographic	  location	  places	  it	  directly	  at	  an	  east-­‐west	  corridor	  that	  allows	  for	  cultural	  and	  economical	  exchange.	  Its	  geographic	  and	  economic	  remunerations	  make	  it	  an	  attractive	  investment	  prospect	  for	  Western	  nations,	  which	  Russia	  sees	  Western	  involvement	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  its	  interests.	  	  When	  President	  Aliyev	  came	  into	  power	  for	  the	  second	  time1993,	  after	  a	  former	  stint	  in	  the	  presidency	  during	  the	  Soviet	  era	  from	  1969-­‐1982,	  he	  opted	  for	  closer	  ties	  with	  Russia.	  In	  doing	  so	  he	  joined	  the	  Commonwealth	  of	  Independent	  States	  and	  allowed	  Lukoil	  to	  pursue	  projects	  in	  the	  Caspian	  at	  the	  offshore	  oil	  fields	  Chirag	  and	  Guneshli,	  which	  caused	  speculation	  and	  reserve	  among	  western	  nations	  (Cornell	  p.350).	  Many	  analysts	  believe	  that	  Russia	  was	  not	  merely	  a	  geopolitical	  player	  in	  the	  conflict	  but	  an	  active	  participant.	  The	  Russian	  government	  provided	  weapons	  for	  both	  sides,	  and	  corruption	  meant	  that	  many	  officials	  sold	  these	  weapons	  privately	  for	  profit.	  This	  was	  part	  of	  Russia’s	  aim	  to	  make	  both	  Armenia	  and	  Azerbaijan	  dependent	  on	  the	  Russian	  government	  during	  the	  conflict	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  Russia’s	  superiority	  in	  the	  region	  (Ismailzade	  p.	  105).	  	  
	  
Historical	  Overview	  
	   To	  provide	  context	  for	  the	  conflict	  in	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh,	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  region	  must	  be	  presented.	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  is	  a	  mountainous	  region	  in	  Azerbaijan	  that	  is	  predominantly	  inhabited	  by	  ethnic	  Armenians	  of	  Orthodox	  beliefs,	  contrasting	  greatly	  with	  the	  Turkic	  Muslim	  majority	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  Azerbaijan.	  It	  is	  believed	  that	  “Gorbachev’s	  reformist	  policies	  were	  transformed	  into	  the	  ethnic	  politics	  of	  ‘national	  self-­‐determination	  and	  democratization’.	  These	  policies	  provided	  opportunities	  for	  the	  mobilization	  of	  nationalism	  amongst	  the	  already	  antagonistic	  Armenian	  and	  Azerbaijani	  communities.(Geukjian,	  p.130).	  The	  “Armenia-­‐Azerbaijan	  quarrel	  of	  1988	  was	  the	  first	  stone	  in	  the	  avalanche	  of	  ethno-­‐territorial	  disputes	  that	  swept	  away	  the	  Soviet	  empire”	  (de	  Waal	  pg.	  9).	  As	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  collapsed,	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  sought	  to	  leave	  the	  Azerbaijani	  Soviet	  Socialist	  Republic	  (SSR)	  and	  merge	  with	  Armenian	  SSR.	  Tension	  came	  to	  a	  head	  in	  1988	  when	  violence	  broke	  out	  and	  culminated	  into	  a	  war	  between	  Armenia	  and	  Azerbaijan.	  The	  conflict	  involved	  informal	  militias,	  as	  well	  as	  two	  newly	  formed	  and	  ill-­‐trained	  national	  armies,	  and	  the	  remnants	  of	  the	  Soviet	  military	  (Vicken).	  	  The	  fighting	  ended	  in	  1994	  due	  to	  an	  uneasy	  ceasefire	  that	  left	  17,000	  dead	  and	  over	  a	  million	  internally	  displaced	  citizens.	  The	  region	  was	  ethnically	  cleansed.	  Nearly	  40,000	  Azeri’s	  lived	  in	  the	  region	  prior	  to	  the	  conflict	  and	  now	  their	  numbers	  are	  null.	  Armenian	  forces	  occupy	  approximately	  14%	  of	  Azerbaijan’s	  territory,	  including	  the	  Lachin	  corridor,	  which	  connects	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  with	  mainland	  Armenia	  (de	  Waal	  p.	  285).	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  had	  
declared	  independence	  in	  1991	  and	  was	  recognized	  by	  Armenia	  in	  1998	  (International	  Crisis	  Group).	  	  	  	  
	  http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/DetailansichtPubDB_EN?recid=2478	  	  
	  
	  
Ethnicity	  and	  Religion:	  Schism	  versus	  Brotherhood	  	  	  Ethnicity	  plays	  a	  much	  larger	  part	  in	  the	  Armenian-­‐Azerbaijani	  conflict	  than	  it	  did	  in	  the	  Russo-­‐Georgian	  war	  because	  of	  the	  religious	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  antagonists.	  Armenia	  shares	  a	  kinship	  with	  Russia	  despite	  a	  different	  ethnic	  background	  because	  of	  their	  sharing	  an	  eastern	  Orthodox	  faith.	  Russia	  as	  always	  
seen	  Islam	  as	  an	  extremist	  threat	  and	  as	  most	  Azeri	  citizens	  are	  Muslim,	  Azerbaijan	  feels	  that	  Russia	  favors	  Armenia	  and	  its	  intervention	  and	  mediation	  were	  meant	  to	  tame	  Azerbaijan’s	  ambition	  for	  a	  diversified	  foreign	  policy.	  Azerbaijan	  believes	  that	  “there	  is	  a	  worldwide	  hostility	  against	  the	  Turks	  and	  the	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  conflict	  is	  seen	  as	  proof	  of	  this.	  Azerbaijanis	  argue	  that	  the	  great	  powers	  are	  trying	  to	  weaken	  Turkey	  and	  Azerbaijan	  through	  this	  conflict”	  (Ibid).	  The	  very	  name	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  echoes	  the	  Russian,	  Turkic,	  and	  Persian	  influence	  in	  the	  region.	  “Nagorno	  or	  nagorny	  means	  “mountainous”	  in	  Russian,	  kara	  means	  “black”	  in	  Turkish,	  and	  bagh	  denotes	  a	  “garden”	  in	  Persian.	  Armenians	  call	  this	  region	  Artsakh,	  while	  Azeris	  call	  it	  Yuqari	  or	  Daghliq	  Karabakh”(Oganesyan	  p.	  6).	  The	  fact	  that	  even	  the	  name	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  was	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  various	  cultures	  that	  converged	  in	  the	  region	  shows	  the	  importance	  various	  ethnicities	  and	  cultures	  in	  how	  the	  conflict	  played	  out.	  Azerbaijani	  citizens	  “define	  themselves	  as	  the	  victims	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  not	  only	  because	  they	  are	  Muslims,	  but	  also	  because	  they	  are	  Turks”	  (Tokluoglu	  p.1225).	  	   Throughout	  history,	  Russia	  and	  Armenia	  have	  maintained	  intimate	  ties.	  In	  tsarist	  Russia	  during	  the	  1800’s,	  “thousands	  of	  Armenian	  families	  were	  resettled	  from	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  to	  the	  Caucasus	  to	  increase	  Russia's	  security	  along	  the	  border	  with	  Turkey.	  It	  was	  clear	  that	  Russia	  trusted	  in	  the	  loyalty	  of	  its	  fellow	  Christians.	  Thus,	  Armenia	  became	  a	  loyal	  bastion	  of	  Russia	  in	  the	  South	  Caucasus,	  something	  that	  Moscow	  was	  not	  willing	  to	  give	  up”	  (Ismailzade).	  Azerbaijan,	  a	  Turkic	  Muslim	  nation,	  despite	  its	  secularity,	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  threat	  due	  to	  its	  linguistic	  and	  cultural	  ties	  with	  Turkey,	  a	  NATO	  member	  which	  has	  a	  onerous	  
and	  virulent	  history	  with	  Russia.	  Hence,	  from	  the	  beginning,	  many	  Azerbaijani	  citizens	  were	  convinced	  that	  “towards	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  Russia	  supported	  the	  position	  of	  Armenia	  and	  was	  doing	  its	  best	  to	  empower	  its	  small	  South	  Caucasian	  ally	  as	  much	  as	  possible”	  (Ismailzade).	  	  	  The	  conflict	  in	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  “polarizes	  the	  regional	  powers,	  with	  Russian	  support	  for	  Armenia	  and	  Turkey’s	  strategic	  partnership	  with	  Azerbaijan	  dividing	  the	  wider	  Caucasus	  region	  into	  two	  opposing	  blocs.	  These	  close	  alliances	  may	  provide	  security	  for	  the	  two	  South	  Caucasus	  states,	  but	  they	  ultimately	  undermine	  security	  across	  the	  region	  as	  they	  hamper	  resolution	  of	  the	  conflict,	  often	  exacerbating	  existing	  tensions	  and	  mistrust	  rather	  than	  boosting	  the	  security	  of	  either	  the	  states	  involved	  or	  actors	  across	  the	  wider	  region”	  (German	  p.	  222).	  These	  alliances	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  antagonistic	  relations	  between	  Eastern	  Orthodoxy	  and	  Turkic	  Muslims.	  Armenia	  sees	  Turkey	  as	  a	  threat,	  due	  to	  the	  Armenian	  genocide,	  and	  Turkish	  support	  of	  Azerbaijan	  “allows	  Yerevan	  to	  perceive	  a	  military	  threat	  from	  Turkey	  and	  thus	  increase	  its	  reliance	  on	  Russia,	  fuelling	  further	  instability”	  (German	  p.	  222).	  Unless	  Turkey	  and	  Armenia	  normalize	  relations	  “there	  will	  be	  no	  lasting	  solution	  to	  the	  conflict,	  which	  is	  the	  most	  pressing	  obstacle	  to	  stability	  and	  co-­‐operation	  in	  the	  South	  Caucasus”	  (Ibid).	  	   The	  region	  of	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  has	  a	  history	  of	  conflict	  between	  the	  two	  inhabiting	  ethnic	  groups.	  The	  most	  notable	  major	  clashes	  between	  Armenians	  and	  Azerbaijanis	  first	  occurred	  between	  1905-­‐1907	  in	  what	  was	  called	  the	  “Armeno-­‐Tatar	  Wars”	  (Oganesyan	  p.	  6).	  Unrest	  continued	  and	  conflict	  re-­‐emerged	  along	  with	  deportation	  in	  1918-­‐1920	  following	  the	  collapse	  of	  imperialist	  Russia.	  Azerbaijan	  
and	  Armenia	  became	  independent	  for	  a	  short	  period	  before	  their	  incorporation	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  as	  Soviet	  Socialist	  Republics.	  The	  two	  republics	  argued	  over	  the	  control	  of	  enclaves	  Nakhichevan,	  Zangezur	  and	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  (Oganesyan	  p.	  6).	  	  The	  boundaries	  that	  currently	  encompass	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  trace	  their	  existence	  to	  1920	  upon	  incorporation	  into	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (Ibid).	  The	  region	  was	  first	  assigned	  to	  the	  Armenian	  republic	  but	  was	  later	  given	  over	  to	  Azerbaijani	  control	  (Ibid).	  The	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  Autonomous	  Oblast	  was	  formed	  in	  1923,	  and	  although	  Armenia	  repeatedly	  tried	  to	  regain	  control	  over	  the	  region	  diplomatically,	  conflict	  only	  started	  to	  occur	  in	  the	  late	  1980’s(Oganesyan	  p.	  7).	  	  	   	   In	  1989,	  when	  the	  conflict	  brewed,	  ethnic	  Armenians	  made	  comprised	  approximately	  77%	  of	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  population	  (International	  Crisis	  Group).	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  war	  and	  the	  dominance	  of	  Armenian	  forces	  in	  the	  region,	  Azeri’s	  were	  forcibly	  displaced	  and	  in	  2001	  the	  census	  estimated	  that	  the	  population	  of	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  was	  95%	  Armenian	  (de	  Waal	  p.	  284).	  This	  allowed	  for	  the	  Armenian	  majority	  to	  control	  the	  political	  situation	  in	  the	  region	  with	  support	  from	  mainland	  Armenia.	  It	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  will	  rejoin	  Azerbaijan	  as	  doing	  so	  would	  put	  the	  region	  under	  Azerbaijani	  control,	  perhaps	  forcibly	  re-­‐inhabiting	  the	  area	  with	  Azeri	  counterparts,	  which	  would	  renew	  the	  conflict.	  	  
	  
Russian	  Interests	  
While	  the	  intensity	  of	  Russia’s	  influence	  and	  power	  in	  the	  region	  has	  waned	  and	  resurged,	  	  “Russian	  policies	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  have	  been	  remarkably	  consistent	  
since	  the	  early	  1990s.	  Once	  the	  Russian	  state	  became	  consolidated,	  Moscow	  sought	  to	  sustain	  its	  preeminent	  influence	  in	  the	  region,	  jealously	  guarding	  its	  interests	  there	  and	  overtly	  seeking	  to	  establish	  an	  acceptance—	  not	  only	  regionally	  but	  internationally—	  that	  the	  Caucasus	  was	  within	  Russia‘s	  sphere	  of	  influence”	  (Cornell	  p.339).	  Russia’s	  imperialist	  thinking	  “was	  elevated	  to	  the	  highest	  state	  hierarchies	  with	  the	  arrival	  to	  power	  of	  Vladimir	  Putin	  in	  1999”	  (Cornell	  p.339).	  	  
The	  Russian	  government	  is	  never	  shy	  in	  pursuing	  its	  foreign	  policy	  interests,	  and	  its	  involvement	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  has	  made	  a	  tremendous	  example	  of	  this.	  Russia	  has	  developed	  and	  expended	  a	  “variety	  of	  mainly	  coercive	  strategies,	  ranging	  from	  fomenting	  ethnic	  conflict	  and	  supporting	  separatist	  forces	  to	  using	  economic	  leverage	  and	  outright	  military	  force,	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  region	  does	  not	  slip	  from	  its	  control”	  (Cornell	  p.	  338).	  Russia’s	  belief	  that	  it	  should	  maintain	  economic,	  political	  and	  cultural	  superiority	  in	  the	  self	  proclaimed	  ‘near	  abroad’	  mean	  that	  Russia	  believes	  that	  it	  has	  special	  responsibilities	  in	  the	  region	  (Croissant	  p.63).	  Russia	  aims	  to	  restore	  its	  international	  status	  as	  world	  superpower,	  and	  a	  ‘hard	  power’	  military	  doctrine	  enacted	  by	  its	  involvement	  in	  the	  post	  soviet	  space	  is	  a	  key	  factor	  in	  reaching	  these	  goals	  (Ibid).	  The	  military	  doctrine,	  adopted	  in	  1993,	  stated	  that	  military	  force	  would	  not	  only	  be	  used	  to	  deter	  belligerence	  against	  Russia	  itself	  but	  also	  to	  protect	  the	  “vital	  interests	  of	  Russia”(Rogov).	  With	  such	  formidable	  perseverance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Moscow,	  Azerbaijan‘s	  foreign	  policy	  and	  economic	  goals	  forever	  face	  extortion	  and	  intimidation	  from	  their	  larger	  and	  more	  powerful	  neighbor	  to	  the	  north.	  Baku’s	  relationship	  with	  Moscow	  naturally	  is	  the	  most	  influential	  and	  important	  for	  Azerbaijan	  when	  it	  considers	  both	  its	  domestic	  and	  
international	  interests.	  Moscow	  has	  shown	  that	  it	  is	  both	  competent	  and	  enthusiastic	  in	  commanding	  leverage	  in	  the	  region	  and	  remains	  the	  largest	  threat	  to	  Azerbaijan	  in	  both	  the	  regional	  and	  global	  realm	  (Cornell,	  pg.	  338).	  	  
Azerbaijan	  realized	  its	  fragility	  in	  the	  face	  of	  Russian	  interests	  and	  pursued	  an	  “assertiveness	  in	  selecting	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  policies	  …	  [which]	  for	  [Azerbaijan]	  was	  …	  a	  matter	  of	  growing	  up	  and	  walking	  on	  [its]	  feet	  rather	  than	  being	  held	  by	  the	  hand	  by	  ‘big	  brother’	  Russia”,	  a	  means	  of	  “shaking	  off	  political	  dependencies	  and	  establishing	  full	  sovereignty”	  (Pourchot	  2008,	  8).	  As	  seen	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  “The	  2008	  conflict	  between	  Russia	  and	  Georgia	  demonstrated	  Moscow’s	  willingness	  to	  resort	  to	  military	  force	  in	  support	  of	  its	  allies	  and	  enabled	  it	  to	  develop	  a	  considerable	  military	  presence	  in	  the	  South	  Caucasus,	  reinforcing	  its	  diplomatic	  and	  economic	  levers”	  (German	  p.	  216).	  Henceforth	  “Armenia	  feels	  its	  position…to	  be	  strengthened	  in	  the	  knowledge	  that	  Moscow	  will	  not	  shy	  away	  from	  using	  force	  to	  protect	  its	  interests	  and	  allies…Azerbaijan	  may	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  resort	  to	  military	  force	  to	  regain	  control	  of	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh,	  unwilling	  to	  risk	  a	  full-­‐scale	  military	  confrontation	  with	  Russia	  and	  the	  possible	  loss	  of	  further	  territory”	  (German	  p.	  216).	  This	  quote	  exemplifies	  Russia’s	  strategy	  in	  the	  region.	  Although	  Russia	  sees	  Armenia	  as	  a	  temporal	  ally	  due	  to	  their	  shared	  Christian	  faith	  and	  the	  latter’s	  heavy	  dependence	  on	  the	  former	  for	  economic	  security,	  Russia	  has	  a	  great	  interest	  in	  fomenting	  instability	  in	  the	  region.	  Russia	  greatly	  fears	  the	  prospect	  of	  Islamic	  extremism	  on	  its	  southern	  flank,	  and	  henceforth	  sees	  Azerbaijan	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  Russian	  stability,	  as	  it	  lies	  just	  below	  that	  volatile	  Dagestan	  region	  of	  the	  northern	  
Caucasus,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  Russia’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  region	  (Croissant	  p.65).	  
Following	  the	  color	  revolution	  in	  Georgia	  in	  2003	  and	  Ukraine	  in	  2004,	  “Russia‘s	  policies	  toward	  its	  neighbors	  grew	  considerably	  more	  aggressive.	  Indeed,	  in	  addition	  to	  geopolitical	  competition,	  an	  ideological	  element	  entered	  Eurasian	  politics.	  Moscow	  now	  fervently	  sought	  to	  prevent	  the	  spread	  of	  democratically	  minded	  governments	  on	  its	  borders,	  viewing	  them	  as	  a	  threat	  not	  only	  to	  Russia‘s	  influence	  but	  to	  its	  own	  system	  of	  government”	  (Cornell,	  p.341-­‐2).	  Upon	  Putin’s	  ascension	  to	  power,	  where	  his	  main	  goals	  were	  to	  bolster	  Russia’s	  international	  recognition	  and	  increase	  power	  in	  the	  ‘near	  abroad’,	  Moscow	  articulated	  a	  strategy	  with	  five	  strategic	  objectives	  in	  order	  to	  undermine	  the	  spread	  of	  democracy	  in	  the	  Former	  Soviet	  Union:	  “insulate,	  redefine,	  bolster,	  subvert,	  and	  coordinate”	  (Ambrosio).	  Former	  Soviet	  Republics,	  especially	  in	  the	  Caucasus,	  were	  the	  target	  of	  this	  policy.	  Russia	  realized	  that	  its	  control	  over	  the	  ‘near	  abroad’	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  stave	  off	  western	  investment	  and	  influence	  in	  the	  FSU.	  Moscow	  conceived	  three	  demands	  that	  served	  as	  the	  driving	  force	  in	  the	  Reconquista	  of	  the	  Caucasus:	  CIS	  membership,	  the	  concession	  of	  Russian	  troops	  on	  the	  nation’s	  borders,	  and	  the	  allowance	  of	  Russian	  military	  bases	  inside	  the	  nation’s	  territory.	  “These	  requirements	  would	  become	  an	  important	  part	  of	  Russia‘s	  sphere	  of	  influence	  military	  doctrine,	  issued	  the	  following	  year”	  (Cornell	  p.343).	  Azerbaijan	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  CIS,	  and	  troops	  forcibly	  entered	  Azerbaijan	  during	  Black	  January	  and	  aided	  the	  Armenian	  enclave,	  but	  there	  are	  no	  Russian	  military	  Bases	  in	  Azerbaijan.	  Russia	  




International	  Negotiations	  	  The	  primary	  difficulties	  in	  establishing	  a	  lasting	  settlement	  between	  Armenia	  and	  Azerbaijan	  are;	  “Armenian	  distaste	  for	  Azeri	  rule,	  Azeri	  dislike	  of	  Karabakhi	  independence,	  and	  an	  inability	  on	  either	  side	  to	  commit	  themselves	  to	  sustaining	  difficult	  concessions	  over	  time.	  There	  is,	  therefore,	  a	  need	  for	  a	  third	  party	  to	  intervene,	  but	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  find	  anyone	  to	  play	  this	  role”	  (Graham).	  The	  difficulty	  of	  the	  situation	  s	  aptly	  explained	  by	  Muhammad	  Asif	  Noor,	  who	  states	  that	  the	  
	  “Armenians	  are	  not	  willing	  to	  withdraw	  troops	  from	  Azeri	  territories	  until	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  is	  recognized	  as	  independent;	  Azerbaijan	  insists	  on	  its	  complete	  territorial	  integrity	  and	  demands	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  Armenian	  troops	  before	  it	  will	  discuss	  any	  other	  matters,	  including	  the	  eventual	  status	  of	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh.	  The	  locking	  of	  positions	  of	  both	  states	  has	  made	  a	  stalemate	  and	  lead	  of	  continue	  suffering	  of	  humanity	  of	  the	  region”	  (Noor	  p.10).  The	  Goble	  plan	  was	  introduced	  in	  1992.	  The	  idea	  was	  that	  Azerbaijan	  would	  relinquish	  its	  claim	  to	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  and	  Armenia	  would	  henceforth	  withdraw	  from	  other	  occupied	  territories	  in	  Azerbaijan	  and	  establish	  a	  traversable	  corridor	  between	  the	  enclave	  of	  Nakhichevan	  and	  mainland	  Azerbaijan	  (Graham).	  This	  plan	  was	  abandoned,	  as	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  neither	  nation	  was	  willing	  to	  make	  such	  drastic	  concessions	  in	  return	  for	  a	  peaceful	  resolution	  in	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh:	  the	  pride	  and	  territorial	  integrity	  of	  both	  nations	  was	  on	  the	  line.	  	  Gamaghelyan	  articulates	  that, “There	  are	  a	  large	  number	  of	  stakeholders	  whose	  interests	  require	  lasting	  peace,	  yet	  these	  interests	  are	  rarely	  understood	  and	  articulated,	  and	  their	  potential	  for	  resolving	  the	  conflict	  is	  underutilized.	  In	  addition	  to	  politics,	  there	  are	  other	  factors	  that	  influence	  the	  conflict.	  Specifically,	  the	  conflict	  has	  a	  strong	  identity	  component	  that	  manifests	  itself	  in	  deep	  mutual	  mistrust	  rooted	  in	  hostile	  historical	  memories.	  The	  identity	  needs	  of	  Armenians	  and	  Azerbaijanis,	  however,	  are	  neglected	  in	  the	  current	  official	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  peace	  process”	  (Gamaghelyan	  p.34).	  	  If	  attention	  is	  not	  paid	  to	  identity,	  then	  the	  antagonistic	  parties	  will	  only	  become	  more	  polarized	  and	  the	  prospect	  of	  resolution	  will	  become	  more	  remote.	  In	  1992,	  the	  OSCE	  generated	  the	  “Minsk	  Group	  to	  encourage	  a	  peaceful	  negotiated	  resolution	  to	  the	  conflict	  between	  Azerbaijan	  and	  Armenia	  over	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh.	  The	  group	  consists	  of	  a	  co-­‐chairmanship	  (France,	  Russia,	  and	  the	  United	  States)	  along	  with	  Belarus,	  Germany,	  Italy,	  Portugal,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Sweden,	  Finland,	  
Turkey,	  Armenia,	  and	  Azerbaijan”	  (Graham).	  “The	  Minsk	  Group	  of	  the	  OSCE	  is	  widely	  regarded	  as	  ineffective,	  unable	  to	  achieve	  any	  progress	  towards	  a	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  solution	  because	  of	  the	  competing	  interests	  and	  goals	  of	  its	  co-­‐chairs	  -­‐	  the	  United	  States,	  Russia	  and	  France”(Ismailzade	  p.106).	  Azerbaijan	  and	  Armenia,	  exasperated	  with	  the	  ineffectual	  negotiations,	  leading	  them	  to	  heavily	  criticize	  mediators	  for	  a	  lack	  of	  a	  satisfactory	  outcome,	  and	  “has	  stressed	  the	  mounting	  frustration,	  disappointment	  and	  calls	  for	  war	  among	  the	  Azeri	  public.	  The	  Minsk	  Group	  co-­‐chairs,	  in	  their	  turn,	  blame	  everything	  on	  the	  Azeri	  and	  Armenian	  presidents,	  and	  consider	  themselves	  to	  be	  facilitators	  only,	  not	  negotiators”(Ismailzade	  p.106).	  The	  involvement	  of	  think	  tanks	  and	  regional	  NGO’s,	  media	  and	  educators	  could	  be	  helpful	  in	  resolving	  this	  frozen	  conflict.	  More	  direct	  conversation	  with	  international	  mediators	  is	  necessary,	  as	  non-­‐biased	  third	  parties	  who	  are	  willing	  to	  involve	  themselves	  in	  workshops	  and	  observe	  conferences	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  conflict	  could	  be	  extremely	  helpful.	  Overall,	  there	  are	  not	  many	  organizations	  involved	  in	  the	  negotiations	  and	  sincere	  interest	  could	  help	  move	  ideas	  from	  proposals	  to	  actual	  initiatives	  (Gamaghelyan	  p.54).	  However	  unproductive	  the	  negotiations	  due	  to	  the	  opposing	  and	  antagonistic	  views	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Russia	  and	  the	  uninterested	  neutrality	  of	  the	  other	  member	  state,	  the	  Azerbaijani	  government	  as	  well	  as	  global	  analysts	  view	  Russia	  “as	  perhaps	  the	  single	  greatest	  impediment	  to	  a	  resolution	  of	  the	  conflict”	  (Cornell	  p.353-­‐4).	  Alstadt	  fittingly	  says,	  “even	  while	  fanning	  the	  flames,	  Russia	  touts	  itself	  as	  ‘peacekeeper’”	  (Alstadt	  p.240).	  Alstadt	  means	  that	  although	  Russia	  is	  an	  active	  participant	  in	  peace	  negotiations,	  government	  instability	  in	  Azerbaijan	  allows	  
Russia	  to	  have	  greater	  political	  and	  economic	  control	  on	  the	  region.	  	  In	  taking	  Armenia’s	  side,	  instead	  of	  remaining	  neutral,	  Russia’s	  actions	  ensure	  that	  a	  rivalry	  will	  remain	  constant	  between	  Azerbaijan	  and	  Armenia,	  making	  effective	  mediation	  impossible.	  All	  nations	  involved	  in	  the	  negotiation	  process	  realize	  “Russia‘s	  centrality	  to	  any	  solution.	  	  Azerbaijani	  representatives	  even	  lamented	  Russia‘s	  position	  as	  co-­‐chair	  of	  the	  Minsk	  Group,	  perhaps	  understanding	  the	  necessity	  of	  bringing	  in	  Russia	  but	  simultaneously	  pointing	  out	  the	  absurdity	  of	  a	  mediator	  that	  was	  also	  in	  a	  military	  alliance	  with	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  conflict”	  (Cornell	  p.354).	  Essentially	  this	  means	  that	  Russia	  cannot	  be	  an	  unbiased	  mediator	  regarding	  the	  conflict	  because	  it	  supports	  the	  Armenians,	  and	  thus	  will	  seek	  out	  negotiations	  that	  would	  benefit	  Armenia	  and	  have	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  Azerbaijan.	  Azerbaijani	  analysts	  have	  observed,	  “When	  relations	  between	  Moscow	  and	  Washington	  improve,	  there	  is	  progress	  in	  the	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  negotiations,	  with	  some	  signs	  of	  hope	  for	  a	  lasting	  solution.	  When	  US-­‐Russian	  relations	  deteriorate,	  the	  peace	  process	  runs	  into	  complete	  deadlock”	  (Ismailzade	  p.111).	  An	  example	  of	  this	  was	  during	  the	  1990’s	  under	  Yeltsin	  before	  Putin	  had	  taken	  office.	  The	  west	  still	  had	  high	  hopes	  for	  Russia	  and	  cooperated	  with	  them	  on	  a	  large	  scale.	  During	  this	  time	  the	  Minsk	  group	  was	  created	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Goble	  Plans	  and	  the	  Prague	  Process.	  Through	  these	  organizations,	  numerous	  conferences	  and	  campaigns	  were	  created	  to	  create	  lasting	  peace	  in	  the	  region.	  However,	  after	  Putin	  became	  president	  in	  2000,	  he	  created	  a	  more	  aggressive	  foreign	  policy	  that	  was	  and	  still	  is	  less	  cooperative	  with	  the	  west.	  Russian-­‐western	  relations	  have	  since	  greatly	  deteriorated,	  in	  large	  part	  due	  to	  the	  Russo-­‐Georgian	  war,	  the	  annexations	  of	  Crimea,	  and	  unrest	  in	  
Eastern	  Ukraine.	  Negotiations	  have	  mostly	  come	  to	  a	  standstill	  during	  the	  2000’s.	  Since	  Armenia	  is	  backed	  by	  Russia	  and	  Azerbaijan	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  main	  lesson	  to	  draw	  from	  the	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  conflict	  is	  that	  geopolitics	  is	  a	  major	  player	  in	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  negotiations.	  Armenia	  and	  Azerbaijan	  are	  blamed	  by	  the	  international	  community	  for	  their	  unwillingness	  to	  make	  concessions.	  However,	  other	  major	  influences	  in	  the	  region	  such	  as	  Russia	  and	  the	  United	  States	  have	  a	  large	  impact	  on	  the	  proceedings.	  “It	  is	  no	  coincidence	  that	  Azerbaijanis	  believe	  the	  keys	  to	  a	  solution	  are	  to	  be	  found	  in	  Moscow	  and	  Washington.	  At	  the	  moment,	  the	  status	  quo	  is	  likely	  to	  continue”	  (Ismailzade	  p.111).	  It	  is	  believed	  that	  the	  situation	  will	  improve	  only	  if	  Russo-­‐American	  relations	  drastically	  recover.	  	  In	  2004	  a	  different	  process	  for	  negotiations	  was	  introduced.	  This	  is	  known	  as	  The	  Prague	  Process.	  The	  main	  mediators	  are	  France,	  Russia,	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  If	  a	  consensus	  is	  reached,	  Armenia	  and	  Azerbaijan	  have	  agreed	  that	  the	  five	  of	  the	  seven	  districts	  adjacent	  to	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  occupied	  by	  Armenian	  forces	  would	  be	  returned	  to	  Azerbaijan	  control	  along	  with	  the	  deployment	  of	  international	  peacekeepers	  (Graham	  p.56).	  The	  part	  of	  the	  negotiation	  that	  has	  proved	  most	  difficult	  is	  the	  status	  of	  Lachin	  and	  Kelbajar,	  which	  border	  Armenia	  (Graham	  p.54).	  The	  Armenians	  of	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  would	  like	  a	  corridor	  that	  linked	  them	  to	  mainland	  Armenia	  as	  well	  as	  the	  demilitarization	  of	  Kelbajar.	  Azerbaijan,	  conversely,	  demands	  that	  Armenians	  withdraw	  from	  these	  two	  territories,	  allowing	  Azeri	  citizens	  to	  return.	  This	  ‘right	  to	  return’	  is	  a	  large	  point	  of	  contention	  in	  the	  negotiations	  that	  have	  brought	  discussion	  to	  a	  stand	  still.	  	  A	  referendum	  on	  a	  vote	  would	  create	  the	  decision,	  and	  thus	  both	  Armenians	  and	  Azerbaijanis	  are	  concerned	  
with	  who	  will	  be	  allowed	  to	  vote.	  At	  the	  moment	  it	  seems	  that	  negotiations	  are	  going	  to	  stall	  for	  the	  near	  future	  (Graham	  p.54).	  
	  
Conclusion	  In	  conclusion,	  Russia’s	  main	  interest	  in	  the	  region,	  and	  Azerbaijan	  in	  particular,	  is	  to	  maintain	  instability	  through	  ethnic	  conflict	  so	  that	  it	  can	  assert	  its	  influence	  and	  preeminence	  in	  the	  face	  of	  western	  investment	  in	  hopes	  of	  restoring	  and	  protecting	  its	  territorial	  integrity	  (Croissant	  p.62).	  Azerbaijan’s	  natural	  resources	  have	  led	  the	  leadership	  to	  pursue	  a	  multi-­‐vector	  foreign	  policy	  that	  Russia	  sees	  as	  threatening	  to	  its	  interests.	  Russia	  is	  a	  main	  source	  of	  natural	  gas	  and	  oil	  and	  sees	  Azerbaijan	  as	  a	  competitor.	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Europe	  have	  pushed	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  pipelines	  that	  originate	  in	  Azerbaijan,	  run	  through	  Georgia,	  and	  bypass	  Russia.	  The	  loss	  of	  this	  economic	  opportunity	  and	  access	  control	  point	  led	  Russia	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  conflict.	  Since	  the	  main	  third	  party	  negotiators	  are	  Russia	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  discussion	  has	  come	  to	  an	  ideological	  standstill,	  and	  the	  OCSE	  funded	  Minsk	  Group	  has	  made	  little	  progress	  in	  defusing	  the	  frozen	  conflict.	  	  Whereas	  Russia	  is	  apt	  to	  defend	  its	  Christian	  brethren,	  Armenia,	  a	  weaker	  state	  that	  is	  more	  dependent	  on	  the	  former,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  West	  supports	  Azerbaijan,	  who	  aims	  for	  democracy	  and	  has	  an	  affluence	  of	  natural	  resources.	  It	  is	  unlikely	  that	  a	  resolution	  will	  take	  place	  anytime	  soon,	  but	  hopefully	  violence	  does	  not	  have	  to	  break	  out	  once	  more	  in	  order	  for	  the	  conflict	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	  and	  concluded.	  
Russo-­‐Georgian	  War:	  The	  Case	  for	  Russian	  Intervention	  in	  Abkhazia	  
and	  South	  Ossetia	  	  	  	  The	  case	  study	  on	  the	  Russo-­‐Georgian	  War	  will	  outline	  the	  reasons	  that	  led	  to	  Russia’s	  military	  involvement	  alongside	  the	  South	  Ossetian	  and	  Abkhaz	  separatists.	  These	  include	  generating	  unrest	  in	  Georgia	  to	  weaken	  the	  government,	  placating	  ethnic	  populations	  in	  Russian	  territory	  that	  correspond	  with	  separatist	  ethnic	  groups	  in	  Georgia,	  and	  exhibiting	  military	  power	  to	  maintain	  its	  political	  reputation	  in	  the	  Caucasus.	  The	  chapter	  begins	  by	  discussing	  the	  nature	  of	  Russian	  involvement	  in	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia	  and	  a	  historical	  overview	  to	  show	  the	  reader	  how	  to	  interpret	  Russia’s	  foreign	  policy	  motives	  in	  Georgia.	  Russian	  interests	  will	  be	  discussed	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  international	  negotiations	  will	  be	  examined.	  The	  conclusion	  will	  focus	  on	  Russia’s	  attempt	  to	  enhance	  its	  territorial	  integrity	  and	  indicate	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  Russo-­‐Georgian	  War	  on	  Russian	  relations	  with	  the	  US	  and	  EU.	  	   The	  West	  perceives	  Georgia	  as	  one	  of	  the	  weakest	  yet	  most	  independently	  minded	  nations	  in	  the	  CIS.	  Upon	  independence	  it	  voiced	  its	  ambition	  to	  create	  closer	  ties	  with	  Europe	  while	  its	  relations	  with	  Russia	  have	  deteriorated.	  The	  Georgian	  government	  has	  continued	  its	  goal	  of	  distancing	  itself	  from	  the	  influence	  of	  Moscow	  and	  its	  economic	  and	  security	  domination	  in	  the	  region.	  Georgia	  defiantly	  stood	  by	  its	  attempt	  to	  develop	  relations	  with	  the	  West	  while	  pursuing	  friendly	  relations	  with	  Russia	  to	  appease	  any	  feelings	  that	  Georgia	  was	  becoming	  a	  threat	  (Kakachia	  pg.	  87).	  	  Georgia	  has	  a	  lack	  of	  natural	  resources,	  however	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  conduit	  point	  for	  
oil	  and	  natural	  gas	  lines	  progressing	  from	  Central	  Asia	  to	  Europe.	  Georgia,	  being	  Orthodox	  Christian,	  is	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Caucasian	  buffer	  zone	  between	  Turkey	  and	  Iran,	  as	  well	  as	  positioned	  directly	  below	  the	  volatile	  regions	  of	  North	  Ossetia,	  Dagestan,	  and	  Chechnya	  in	  the	  southern	  tail	  of	  Russia	  (Nygren,	  pg.	  101).	  Russian	  interests	  in	  Georgia	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  South	  Caucasus	  focus	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  bastion	  of	  pro-­‐Russian	  states	  that	  protect	  it	  from	  Western	  influence	  (Kakachia	  pg.	  87).	  	  
Russian	  Intervention	  in	  Georgia’s	  Separatist	  States	  Russia	  has	  a	  lengthy	  history	  of	  intervention	  in	  the	  northern	  Caucasus	  due	  to	  conflict	  with	  the	  Muslim	  majority	  in	  this	  region,	  having	  waged	  a	  violent	  war	  with	  Chechnya	  that	  left	  its	  capital	  Grozny	  in	  deep	  disrepair.	  The	  separatist	  regions	  of	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia	  are	  not	  Muslim	  (a	  religion	  that	  Russia	  often	  persecutes	  and	  shows	  violence	  against).	  Many	  celebrate	  Orthodoxy	  or	  native	  religions,	  and	  because	  of	  this,	  Russia	  does	  not	  fear	  Muslim	  extremism	  and	  instead	  aids	  these	  rebel	  territories	  (Enteen).	  The	  problems	  Georgia	  faced	  that	  helped	  facilitate	  an	  atmosphere	  where	  war	  was	  considered	  an	  option	  were	  (1)	  the	  division	  and	  personal	  rivalries	  among	  political	  elites;	  (2)	  their	  willingness	  to	  go	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  achieve	  their	  ambitions,	  even	  bringing	  them	  to	  the	  edge	  of	  civil	  war;	  and	  (3)	  “intense	  Russian	  interest	  and	  involvement	  in	  Georgia	  because	  of	  its	  immediate	  proximity	  to	  the	  Northern	  Caucasus	  and	  the	  Black	  Sea,	  which	  makes	  it	  of	  particular	  significance	  to	  Russia’s	  own	  security	  and	  the	  territorial	  integrity	  of	  the	  Russian	  Federation”	  (Hunter	  pg.	  110).	  	  
Russia	  is	  largely	  dependent	  on	  its	  natural	  resources	  for	  stimulating	  its	  otherwise	  suffering	  economy	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Soviet	  Era.	  The	  crony	  government,	  headed	  by	  President	  Putin	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  Medvedev,	  lacks	  the	  will	  and	  experience	  necessary	  to	  grow	  independent	  business	  and	  a	  diversified	  economy.	  Georgia	  and	  other	  nations	  once	  part	  of	  the	  USSR	  feel	  a	  sense	  of	  pressure	  from	  the	  Russian	  government	  to	  allow	  the	  former’s	  influence	  to	  go	  uninterrupted	  in	  the	  region,	  as	  American	  or	  European	  interest	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  cultural	  and	  economic	  threat	  to	  Russia.	  	  As	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  Trans	  Caucasus	  region	  evolve,	  “the	  legacy	  of	  the	  Soviet	  era	  is	  the	  most	  important	  influence	  to	  which	  the	  region	  has	  been	  subjected.	  In	  fact,	  in	  many	  respects,	  the	  current	  politics,	  social	  structure,	  and	  economic	  infrastructure	  of	  the	  Trans	  Caucasus	  are	  products	  of	  Soviet	  era	  nation-­‐building	  and	  socialist	  development”	  (Hunter	  pg.	  13).	  	  The	  former	  republics	  of	  the	  USSR,	  especially	  Georgia,	  are	  still	  highly	  influenced	  by	  Soviet	  ideology	  and	  mythology,	  meaning	  that	  many	  of	  the	  ethnic	  conflicts	  present	  post-­‐independence	  can	  trace	  their	  ‘heir	  to	  the	  thrown’	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Era	  and	  ethno	  nationalism	  (Kelleher	  pg.	  337).	  	  Kelleher	  also	  mentions	  that	  how	  the	  ethnic	  conflicts	  are	  managed	  “will	  have	  a	  direct	  and	  crucial	  impact	  on	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  development	  of	  the	  new	  states…[and]	  the	  ability	  and	  willingness	  of	  international	  organizations,	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  West,	  to	  resolve	  and	  mediate	  ethnic	  disputes	  will	  determine	  whether	  democratization	  grows	  or	  withers	  in	  the	  face	  of	  radical	  politics	  and	  authoritarianism”	  (Kelleher	  pg.	  337).	  This	  statement	  proves	  prophetic	  in	  its	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  West	  shapes	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  world.	  	  Turning	  specifically	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Georgia,	  the	  issue	  of	  
resource	  control	  played	  a	  major	  part	  in	  Russia’s	  interest	  in	  asserting	  its	  power	  over	  Georgia	  and	  welcoming	  the	  self-­‐proclaimed	  independent	  regions	  of	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia	  (Kelleher	  pg.	  340).	  	  	  
Historical	  Overview	  Although	  the	  Russo-­‐Georgian	  Conflict	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2008	  is	  widely	  known,	  tension	  between	  Georgia	  and	  its	  minority	  populations	  has	  plagued	  the	  nation	  since	  the	  Soviet	  Era.	  Despite	  economic	  growth	  and	  industrialization	  in	  the	  1970’s	  due	  to	  a	  booming	  agricultural	  sector,	  Georgia	  was	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  centralized	  economy	  of	  the	  USSR.	  The	  Georgian	  government	  suffered	  from	  inefficiency,	  corruption,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  mafias.	  The	  1980’s	  were	  a	  time	  of	  major	  transition	  for	  Georgia.	  In	  1985,	  longtime	  Georgian	  leader	  Eduard	  Shevardnadze	  ended	  his	  leadership	  after	  thirteen	  years	  of	  management.	  His	  jurisdiction	  lasted	  for	  such	  an	  extensive	  amount	  of	  time	  that	  his	  men	  occupied	  all	  of	  the	  highest	  bureaucratic	  posts	  (Hunter	  pg.	  114).	  The	  onset	  of	  glasnost	  and	  perestroika	  under	  Gorbachev	  in	  the	  1980’s	  led	  to	  economic	  deterioration	  because	  of	  Gorbachev’s	  anti-­‐alcohol	  campaign:	  Georgia’s	  agriculture	  centered	  on	  grape	  production	  (Hunter	  pg.	  114).	  This,	  along	  with	  a	  20%	  decrease	  in	  production,	  and	  an	  alarming	  rate	  of	  unemployment,	  led	  to	  widespread	  discontent	  among	  the	  populace	  (Ibid).	  The	  unemployment	  rate	  was	  about	  500,000	  of	  the	  total	  5.5	  million	  population	  of	  Georgia.	  It	  was	  during	  this	  time	  period	  that	  nationalist	  groups	  developed	  and	  academia	  developed	  text	  with	  nationalistic	  undertones.	  In	  October	  1987,	  under	  the	  principles	  of	  “Language,	  Religion,	  and	  Fatherland”	  a	  group	  named	  
the	  Chavchavadze	  Society	  was	  formed	  (Fuller).	  One	  of	  the	  original	  founders	  was	  Zviad	  Gamsakhurdia,	  who	  later	  became	  the	  first	  president	  of	  independent	  Georgia	  (Aves	  pg.	  159).	  As	  Georgian	  nationalism	  developed,	  ethnic	  minorities,	  namely	  the	  Abkhaz	  and	  South	  Ossetians,	  also	  gained	  self-­‐awareness.	  This	  led	  to	  a	  multitude	  of	  conflicting	  political	  and	  ethnic	  loyalties	  that	  has	  “proven	  to	  be	  an	  effective	  tool	  for	  intervention	  by...foreign	  powers	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  Georgia’s	  ethnic	  and	  territorial	  fragmentation”	  (Souleimanov	  pg.	  72).	  In	  the	  late	  1980’s,	  the	  Abkhaz	  and	  ethnic	  Georgians	  disputed	  Georgia’s	  pursuit	  of	  independence	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  In	  1989	  clashes	  between	  Georgians	  and	  the	  Abkhaz	  took	  place	  that	  served	  as	  the	  first	  opportunity	  for	  Russia	  to	  establish	  troops	  in	  the	  area.	  When	  Abkhazia	  declared	  independence	  from	  Georgia	  in	  1990	  and	  elected	  it	  own	  president,	  unrest	  broke	  out	  in	  Tbilisi	  and	  Russian	  forces	  again	  intervened	  (Nygren	  pg.	  101).	  After	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR,	  relations	  between	  these	  two	  distinct	  groups	  continued	  to	  deteriorate.	  In	  1992,	  war	  broke	  out	  in	  Abkhazia,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  massacre	  and	  ethnic	  cleansing	  of	  Georgians	  in	  the	  separatist	  region	  by	  the	  Abkhaz	  and	  Russians	  (Jafalian).	  Also	  in	  1992,	  President	  Zviad	  Gamsakhurdia,	  a	  nationalist,	  with	  an	  anti-­‐Russian	  policy	  was	  ousted	  in	  a	  coup	  d’état	  and	  replaced	  by	  none	  other	  than	  Eduard	  Shevardnadze,	  an	  elite	  with	  pro-­‐Russian	  leanings	  (Jafalian).	  Analysts	  believe	  Russian	  troops	  aided	  the	  rebels	  in	  the	  coup	  d’état.	  In	  1993,	  Gamsakhurdia	  died.	  Many	  believe	  that	  Gamsakhurdia	  was	  assassinated	  because	  of	  a	  bullet	  wound	  to	  the	  head,	  but	  on	  one	  is	  sure	  who	  killed	  him.	  The	  Georgian	  armed	  forces	  were	  defeated	  and	  thereby	  Abkhazia	  celebrated	  its	  independence	  from	  Georgia.	  In	  2008,	  when	  most	  international	  interest	  in	  Russia	  
focused	  on	  the	  conflict	  in	  South	  Ossetia,	  Abkhaz	  fighters	  shot	  at	  Georgian	  forces	  in	  the	  Kodori	  gorge.	  Russia	  sent	  in	  troops	  to	  help	  the	  Abkhaz	  defeat	  the	  Georgian	  forces.	  Georgian	  forces	  were	  overwhelmed	  and	  Georgian	  civilians	  were	  forced	  to	  flee	  Abkhazia.	  Russia	  acknowledged	  Abkhazia’s	  independence	  in	  2008.	  The	  Abkhaz	  parliament	  authorized	  a	  bill	  in	  2009	  to	  construct	  a	  Russian	  military	  base	  in	  Abkhazia	  (Nowak).	  In	  2014	  strengthened	  ties	  when	  President	  Putin	  signed	  an	  agreement	  for	  a	  ‘joint	  defense	  and	  security	  space’	  with	  Abkhaz	  President	  Raul	  Khadzhimb	  (Baczynska).	  	  Although	  Russia	  expected	  his	  regime	  to	  be	  loyal	  to	  Moscow,	  his	  policies	  continued	  Georgia’s	  objectives	  of	  nationalism	  and	  sovereignty	  (Jafalian).	  President	  Putin	  may	  not	  have	  expected	  the	  backlash	  from	  the	  West	  that	  occurred	  in	  2008,	  as,	  in	  the	  1990’s,	  the	  West,	  particularly	  the	  George	  Bush	  Sr.	  administration,	  looked	  on	  the	  situation	  with	  indifference,	  still	  viewing	  the	  area	  within	  Russia’s	  sphere	  of	  influence	  (Jafalian).	  After	  the	  War	  in	  Abkhazia	  ended	  in	  1993,	  the	  Russian	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Andrei	  Kozyrev,	  told	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  that	  “Russia	  realizes	  that	  no	  international	  organization	  or	  group	  of	  states	  can	  replace	  our	  peacekeeping	  efforts	  in	  this	  specific	  post-­‐Soviet	  space”(Fedarko).	  This	  served	  as	  a	  convincing	  gesture	  that	  “Russia’s	  priority	  was	  again,	  after	  some	  period	  of	  hesitation,	  to	  restore	  its	  hegemony	  in	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  space”	  (Jafalian).	  In	  the	  wars	  in	  the	  1990’s	  the	  unprepared	  Georgian	  forces	  were	  defeated,	  and	  the	  state	  so	  weakened	  that	  it	  nearly	  collapsed	  and	  was	  forced	  to	  accept	  peace	  agreements	  with	  Russia,	  entering	  the	  CIS	  on	  October	  21st	  1993	  (Ibid).	  Yeltsin	  and	  Shevardnadze	  signed	  a	  treaty	  of	  Friendship	  and	  Cooperation	  in	  2004.	  This	  treaty	  forced	  Georgia	  to	  allow	  Russia	  to	  
keep	  military	  bases	  in	  Vaziani,	  Akhalkalaki,	  Batumi,	  and	  Gudauta.	  Russia	  also	  kept	  its	  headquarters	  of	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Military	  District	  in	  the	  Georgian	  capital	  of	  Tbilisi.	  This	  allowed	  Russian	  troops	  to	  engage	  peacekeeping	  forces	  in	  Abkhazia	  (Jafalian).	  The	  pinnacle	  of	  political	  tension	  in	  Georgia	  culminated	  in	  2003	  with	  the	  Rose	  Revolution,	  where	  masses	  of	  Georgian	  civilians	  held	  protests	  against	  disputed	  parliamentary	  elections	  that	  Shevardnadze	  may	  have	  doctored.	  Shevardnadze	  did	  this	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  his	  political	  party	  Citizens’	  Union	  of	  Georgia	  or	  the	  CUG	  in	  power,	  despite	  an	  extremely	  low	  approval	  rating	  (Welt).	  The	  protests	  in	  Tbilisi	  that	  ultimately	  ended	  with	  Shevardnadze	  resigning	  and	  the	  election	  of	  Saakashvili	  as	  president	  (Welt	  pg.	  67).	  Russian	  leaders	  were	  not	  tremendously	  upset	  by	  the	  transition,	  as	  they	  were	  relieved	  that	  Shevardnadze	  was	  out	  of	  office.	  However,	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  worsened	  greatly	  when	  upon	  election	  President	  Saakashvili	  stated	  his	  intention	  to	  restore	  the	  territorial	  integrity	  of	  Georgia	  by	  taking	  back	  control	  over	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia	  (Nygren	  pg.	  105).	  Although	  Russia	  at	  first	  helped	  Georgia	  in	  its	  reacquisition	  of	  Ajaria	  along	  Georgia’s	  border	  with	  Turkey	  in	  2007,	  this	  action	  was	  offset	  by	  Russian	  participation	  in	  the	  illegal	  election	  that	  took	  place	  in	  2004	  in	  Abkhazia.	  Georgia	  introduced	  failed	  attempts	  in	  2005-­‐6	  to	  repatriate	  Abkhazia	  under	  Georgian	  political	  control.	  The	  Russian	  “wine	  ban”	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ban	  on	  Georgian	  mineral	  water	  resulted	  in	  a	  trade	  and	  culture	  war	  between	  Russia	  and	  Georgia	  in	  2006	  that	  further	  strained	  relations	  (Nygren	  pg.	  107).	  As	  Russia	  was	  applying	  for	  membership	  to	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (WTO),	  Georgia	  was	  able	  to	  manipulate	  Russia	  into	  
canceling	  trade	  restrictions	  (Ibid).	  Not	  long	  after	  this,	  Russia	  issued	  Russian	  passports	  to	  the	  Abkhaz,	  which	  established	  an	  aura	  of	  permanence	  among	  the	  distrust	  and	  tension	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  (Nygren	  pg.	  105).	  Russia	  then	  accused	  Georgia	  of	  using	  the	  “Pankisi	  valley	  as	  a	  transit	  country	  for	  global	  Islamist	  networks	  heading	  towards	  Chechnya	  and	  of	  supplying	  weapons	  to	  Chechen	  rebels	  against	  Russia”	  (Jafalian).	  This	  accusation	  was	  likely	  fueled	  by	  Georgia’s	  refusal	  to	  let	  the	  Russian	  army	  use	  Georgian	  territory	  to	  fight	  the	  Chechen	  rebels.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  constant	  Russian	  claims	  that	  Al	  Qaida	  and	  the	  Taliban	  were	  hiding	  in	  the	  region	  (a	  ridiculous	  notion)	  backfired,	  and	  led	  to	  a	  security	  initiative	  between	  Georgia	  and	  an	  attentive	  United	  States	  that	  allowed	  for	  American	  military	  presence	  in	  the	  Pankisi	  valley,	  ironically	  Russia’s	  worst	  nightmare	  in	  terms	  of	  national	  security	  (Ibid).	  	  	  	  	  
Russian	  Interests	  	  	   The	  Russian	  Government	  does	  not	  see	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  North	  Caucasus	  (Chechnya,	  Ingushetia	  and	  North	  Ossetia),	  which	  is	  Russian	  territory,	  and	  the	  Southern	  Caucasus	  (Georgia,	  Azerbaijan,	  and	  Armenia).	  The	  government	  believes	  that	  this	  territory	  remains	  as	  a	  whole	  under	  Russian	  regulation.	  This	  means	  that	  Georgia	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  key	  location	  in	  the	  region,	  especially	  because	  of	  its	  South	  Ossetian	  separatist	  region	  that	  corresponds	  to	  the	  North	  Ossetian	  population	  in	  Russia.	  Part	  of	  Russia’s	  belief	  of	  its	  control	  over	  Georgia	  is	  partially	  due	  to	  the	  many	  Soviet	  military	  bases	  that	  were	  built	  in	  Georgia	  (Kakachia	  pg.	  88).	  Russian	  foreign	  policy	  always	  concerns	  one	  issue	  above	  all	  others,	  and	  that	  is	  national	  security	  and	  
territorial	  integrity.	  Therefore	  “in	  [the]	  Kremlin’s	  strategic	  thinking	  if	  you	  have	  Georgia	  under	  your	  control,	  you	  have	  the	  appropriate	  military	  infrastructure	  to	  control	  the	  whole	  Southern	  Caucasus.	  Furthermore,	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  full	  control	  of	  the	  region,	  a	  policy	  of	  divide-­‐and-­‐conquer	  is	  being	  implemented:	  the	  creation	  of	  microstates	  and	  zones	  of	  instability	  enables	  Russia	  to	  remain	  the	  dominant	  regional	  actor”	  (Kakachia	  pg.	  88).	  Russia	  fears	  Georgia’s	  independent	  and	  democratic	  ambitions	  because	  it	  threatens	  Russia’s	  sphere	  of	  influence.	  “Among	  the	  political	  tools	  Russia	  has	  deployed	  to	  pursue	  its	  interests,	  energy	  resources	  are	  one	  of	  the	  most	  fundamental.	  At	  present,	  Russia	  is	  responsible	  for	  a	  significant	  share	  of	  the	  delivery	  of	  oil	  and	  gas	  delivery	  to	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  CIS	  itself”	  (Pochkhua	  pg.	  83).	  	  	  Russia’s	  recognition	  of	  the	  de	  facto	  states	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia	  has	  supported	  a	  form	  of	  territorial	  gerrymandering	  that	  weakens	  Georgian	  influence	  and	  strengthens	  its	  own,	  while	  also	  asserting	  its	  dominance	  in	  the	  region	  and	  demanding	  acknowledgment	  as	  a	  world	  power	  (Hunter	  pg.	  13).	  Russia	  uses	  this	  strategy	  of	  weakening	  states	  in	  its	  ‘near	  abroad’	  to	  maintain	  political	  and	  economic	  dominance	  in	  the	  Former	  Soviet	  Union.	  This	  idea	  is	  not	  new	  to	  Russia.	  It	  has	  been	  practiced	  since	  imperial	  Russia	  by	  the	  Czar’s	  conquests	  and	  the	  idea	  was	  radically	  employed	  by	  Stalin	  during	  his	  rule,	  most	  notably	  in	  the	  Central	  Asian	  region.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  practice	  continues,	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  Georgia	  and	  the	  other	  comparatively	  newly	  minted	  Former	  Soviet	  Republics.	  The	  Soviets	  systematically	  manipulated	  ethnic	  groups	  by	  dissociating	  them	  from	  their	  peers	  in	  order	  to	  make	  them	  easier	  to	  rule	  by	  repressing	  any	  nationalist	  tendencies.	  The	  Abkhaz	  minority	  is	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  this:	  the	  native	  population	  was	  split	  between	  North	  Ossetia	  and	  
Georgia,	  thereby	  complicating	  a	  territory	  dispute	  that	  had	  developed	  in	  Soviet	  times	  (Hunter	  pg.	  14).	  	  	  The	  Ossetians	  faced	  a	  similar	  fate	  that	  undoubtedly	  led	  to	  the	  unrest	  in	  Georgia	  after	  independence.	  Another	  factor	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  de	  facto	  states	  of	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia	  was	  also	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  Soviet	  legacy.	  Historical	  revisionism	  was	  frequently	  used	  by	  the	  Soviets.	  This	  relays	  the	  belief	  that	  history	  can	  be	  rewritten;	  they	  used	  the	  concept	  to	  promote	  socialist	  values	  and	  repress	  ethnic	  expression	  (Hunter	  pg.	  14).	  Ultimately,	  as	  communism	  failed,	  various	  groups	  started	  to	  re-­‐identify	  with	  their	  ethnic	  origins,	  leading	  to	  conflict	  and	  backlash	  after	  nations	  gained	  independence	  upon	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  USSR.	  The	  disputed	  Regions	  of	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia	  that	  have	  broken	  away	  from	  Georgia	  border	  Southern	  Russia’s	  Northern	  Caucasus.	  Abkhazia	  borders	  the	  Black	  Sea,	  which	  is	  seen	  as	  an	  additional	  advantage	  for	  Russia,	  which	  has	  long	  sought	  warm-­‐water	  seaports.	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Russian	  Interests	  The	  Russian	  government	  viewed	  Georgia’s	  ambition	  to	  join	  NATO	  as	  “an	  unacceptable	  flouting	  of	  Russia's	  claim	  to	  a	  privileged	  sphere	  of	  influence	  in	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  region”	  (Light,	  pg.	  1580).	  Among	  the	  factors	  that	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  the	  Kremlin	  to	  pursue	  a	  hard	  liner	  policy,	  the	  most	  influential	  are	  the	  growing	  importance	  of	  Russia	  as	  a	  supplier	  of	  oil	  and	  natural	  gas	  in	  international	  markets	  (particularly	  in	  Europe),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  “severe	  divisions	  within	  NATO	  created	  by	  the	  US	  war	  in	  Iraq”	  (Light,	  pg.	  1580).	  The	  lack	  of	  cohesive	  decision-­‐making	  in	  NATO	  “gave	  Russia	  increased	  room	  for	  diplomatic	  and	  ultimately	  military	  action”	  (Light,	  pg.	  1580).	  When	  the	  United	  States	  and	  European	  nations	  decided	  to	  recognize	  Kosovo	  as	  an	  independent	  nation	  earlier	  in	  2008,	  in	  opposition	  to	  Serbia,	  a	  Russian	  ally,	  the	  government	  felt	  that	  it	  was	  time	  to	  act.	  In	  February	  2008,	  President	  Putin	  
and	  President	  Saakashvili	  of	  Georgia	  met,	  with	  President	  Putin	  reportedly	  having	  said	  ‘you	  know	  we	  have	  to	  answer	  the	  West	  on	  Kosovo.	  And	  we	  are	  very	  sorry	  but	  you	  are	  going	  to	  be	  part	  of	  that	  answer’	  (Asmus	  pg.	  106).	  Some	  of	  the	  major	  mistakes	  of	  the	  Georgian	  government	  that	  preceded	  the	  war	  and	  led	  to	  its	  manifestation	  include	  “the	  nationalistic	  and	  centralizing	  policies	  that	  Georgian	  leaders	  pursued	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  which	  alienated	  many	  Abkhazians	  and	  South	  Ossetians	  and	  helped	  lead	  to	  the	  two	  regions'	  de	  facto	  secession	  from	  Georgia”	  (Light,	  pg.	  1581).	  	  Russia’s	  territorial	  integrity	  was	  in	  question	  because	  of	  the	  continued	  violence	  in	  the	  North	  Caucasus	  and	  the	  Middle	  East.	  The	  Russian	  government	  felt	  its	  security	  was	  threatened	  because	  its	  sphere	  of	  influence	  was	  interrupted	  by	  Western	  intervention.	  Georgia	  no	  longer	  wished	  to	  pursue	  intimate	  relations	  with	  Russia.	  Russia,	  accustomed	  to	  dominance	  in	  its	  immediate	  territorial	  neighborhood,	  felt	  it	  needed	  to	  conduct	  a	  military	  campaign	  to	  prove	  its	  own	  strength	  after	  the	  Soviet	  collapse	  in	  order	  to	  still	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  world	  power.	  Pochkhua	  notes	  that	  although	  “the	  generally	  accepted	  line	  of	  thinking	  would	  dictate	  that	  economic	  and	  social	  pressure	  would	  be	  sufficient…the	  clashes	  that	  took	  place	  in	  2008	  between	  Russia	  and	  Georgia	  tend	  to	  refute	  this	  claim,	  showing	  that	  direct	  military	  involvement	  may	  after	  all	  guarantee	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  goals	  of	  powerful	  states,	  or	  at	  least	  maintain	  the	  status	  quo	  ante”	  (Pochkhua	  pg.	  82).  	  President	  Putin’s	  strong	  leadership	  facilitated	  Russia’s	  ascent	  out	  of	  the	  post	  Soviet	  chaos	  of	  the	  1990’s	  under	  former	  President	  Yeltsin.	  Putin	  has	  been	  using	  his	  rotating	  responsibilities	  as	  president	  and	  prime	  minister	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  to	  
assert	  Russian	  influence	  and	  convince	  the	  West	  that	  the	  world	  is	  no	  longer	  unipolar	  (Pochkhua	  pg.	  82).	  As	  seen	  in	  many	  circumstances	  since	  President	  Putin’s	  ascension	  to	  power,	  the	  use	  of	  military	  force	  and	  hard	  power	  are	  key	  in	  Russia’s	  strategy	  to	  boost	  its	  world	  recognition.	  Russian	  supremacy	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  “deepened	  the	  rift	  between	  the	  region’s	  Muslim	  and	  non-­‐Muslim	  inhabitants.	  It	  even	  exacerbated	  interethnic	  rivalry	  among	  the	  Christians,	  because	  the	  Russian	  overlords	  tended	  to	  shift	  their	  favors	  from	  one	  group	  to	  another”	  (Hunter	  pg.	  12).	  Thus,	  it	  is	  not	  so	  surprising	  that	  the	  South	  Ossetians	  and	  Abkhaz	  resented	  and	  sought	  independence	  from	  Georgia.	  Prior	  to	  August	  of	  the	  2008	  war,	  the	  “Region	  of	  Tskhinvali	  was	  under	  the	  de	  facto	  control	  of	  separatists;	  this	  region	  was	  populated	  both	  by	  Georgians	  and	  Ossetians.	  Villages	  were	  mixed	  in	  a	  chessboard	  order	  that	  actually	  favored	  the	  Georgian	  side,	  and	  were	  under	  the	  official	  control	  of	  the	  Georgian	  government	  in	  Tbilisi”	  (Pochkhua).	  When	  Ossetian	  separatists	  had	  fired	  at	  OSCE	  peace	  observers,	  using	  illegal	  weaponry,	  Russia	  responded	  to	  the	  incident	  by	  proclaiming	  to	  protect	  South	  Ossetians	  from	  Georgian	  aggression	  by	  any	  means	  possible	  (Hunter	  pg.	  12).	  The	  likely	  reason	  behind	  Russia’s	  desire	  to	  back	  separatists	  in	  Georgia	  was	  “the	  fact	  [that]	  it	  did	  not	  want	  to	  set	  the	  precedent	  that	  territorial	  problems	  in	  its	  own	  neighborhood	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  progress	  without	  Moscow's	  mediation…[and]	  was	  also	  likely	  driven	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  openly	  punish	  a	  once	  friendly	  and	  now	  rather	  problematic	  neighbor,	  thus	  ensuring	  for	  itself	  the	  status	  of	  supreme	  power	  in	  the	  region”	  (Pochkhua).	  	  	   	  Even	  before	  the	  war	  in	  2008,	  Russia’s	  primary	  concern	  was	  to	  debilitate	  Georgia’s	  ability	  to	  protect	  itself	  and	  have	  a	  functioning	  economy.	  Russia	  aimed	  to	  
damage	  Georgia’s	  infrastructure	  and	  refused	  to	  negotiate	  with	  President	  Saakashvili,	  hoping	  to	  indict	  him	  for	  war	  crimes	  (Blank	  pg.	  379).	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  “Moscow	  intends	  to	  create	  a	  Georgia	  that	  will	  be	  a	  Russian	  satellite	  ready	  to	  renounce	  its	  Westernizing	  ambitions”	  (Ibid).	  The	  Baku-­‐Tbilisi	  Ceyhan	  (BTC)	  pipeline,	  which	  bypasses	  Russia,	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  threat.	  In	  the	  early	  2000’s	  there	  was	  still	  hope	  that	  through	  destabilizing	  Georgia	  and	  other	  states	  in	  the	  Caucasus,	  Russia	  could	  deter	  investment	  for	  the	  pipeline.	  This	  would	  allow	  Russia	  to	  be	  the	  key	  provider	  for	  Caspian	  oil	  and	  gas,	  therefore	  monopolizing	  the	  European	  resource	  market	  (Blank	  pg.	  379).	  Thus,	  it	  is	  in	  Russian	  interests	  to	  invade	  and	  deteriorate	  territory	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  to	  create	  unrest.	  When	  the	  Georgian	  government	  became	  unstable,	  this	  allowed	  Russia	  to	  maintain	  supremacy	  in	  the	  region	  and	  made	  the	  Georgian	  economy	  dependent	  on	  Russia	  for	  resources.	  Russian	  aircraft	  even	  launched	  surface-­‐to-­‐air	  missiles	  in	  August	  2007	  that	  failed	  to	  detonate.	  The	  reasoning	  behind	  this	  was	  to	  provoke	  NATO	  and	  to	  deter	  Georgia	  from	  proceeding	  with	  its	  aim	  for	  closer	  ties	  with	  the	  organization	  (Blank	  pg.	  384).	  A	  quote	  from	  Stephen	  Blank’s	  analysis	  of	  Russia’s	  motivation	  to	  wage	  war	  in	  Georgia	  states	  that	  	  
“Moscow	  repeatedly	  tried	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Georgian	  government,	  supported	  
assassination	  attempts	  against	  Shevardnadze,	  launched	  over	  flights	  and	  bombing	  
raids,	  instituted	  repeated	  energy	  cutoffs	  and	  trade	  sanctions,	  gave	  Abkhazian	  and	  
South	  Ossetian	  residents	  Russian	  passports,	  blockaded	  Georgia,	  deported	  Georgians	  in	  
Russia,	  and	  bombed	  Georgian	  villages”	  (Blank	  pg.	  384)	  	  
What	  Blank	  claims	  with	  this	  statement	  is	  that	  Russia	  provoked	  Georgia	  into	  a	  conflict,	  and	  did	  everything	  in	  its	  power	  to	  weaken	  the	  Georgian	  government	  before	  doing	  so,	  ensuring	  a	  win	  by	  the	  separatists.	  Russia’s	  invasion	  of	  Georgia	  in	  2008	  and	  its	  recognition	  of	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia	  was	  a	  message	  to	  NATO	  to	  heavily	  consider	  the	  dangers	  of	  expanding	  its	  missions	  and	  membership	  into	  the	  Former	  Soviet	  Union	  (Kakachia	  pg.	  88).	  Concerned	  with	  the	  United	  States-­‐Georgian	  military	  and	  security	  partnership,	  the	  potential	  to	  gain	  military	  footholds	  in	  Georgia	  via	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia	  was	  a	  reassurance	  to	  Russia	  that	  its	  sphere	  of	  influence	  was	  not	  being	  completely	  taken	  over	  by	  the	  West	  (Giorgi).	  Exactly	  who	  started	  the	  war	  is	  still	  highly	  contested.	  Both	  Georgia	  and	  Russia	  accuse	  each	  other	  of	  the	  initial	  offensive	  and	  both	  claim	  defensive	  stances	  (Nygren	  pg.	  108).	  	  The	  Russian	  government	  hopes	  to	  create	  an	  international	  status	  quo	  where	  Moscow	  is	  once	  again	  a	  major	  world	  power,	  and	  the	  Putin	  administration	  has	  chosen	  hard	  power	  to	  do	  so.	  Through	  the	  European	  Union’s	  Eastern	  Partnership	  (EaP)	  program,	  the	  EU	  hoped	  to	  integrate	  the	  former	  soviet	  republics	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  the	  Caucasus	  with	  the	  organization	  by	  “improving	  human	  rights,	  easing	  visa	  regulations,	  and	  ensuring	  energy	  security”	  (Kakachia	  pg.	  88).	  Although	  Russia	  realizes	  the	  economic	  benefits	  it	  could	  gain	  from	  pursuing	  these	  closer	  relations	  with	  the	  EU,	  the	  government’s	  pride	  and	  view	  of	  the	  organization	  as	  a	  rival	  in	  its	  traditional	  sphere	  of	  influence	  prohibits	  Russia	  from	  following	  these	  interests.	  	  
International	  Negotiations	  	  The	  EU	  “acted	  as	  a	  peace	  mediator	  during	  the	  Russo-­‐Georgian	  War	  in	  August	  2008”	  (Forsberg	  &	  Seppo	  pg.	  121).	  The	  EU	  worked	  also	  with	  the	  United	  Nations	  
(UN)	  and	  Organization	  for	  Security	  and	  Cooperation	  in	  Europe	  (OSCE)	  to	  develop	  a	  “monitoring	  mission	  to	  Georgia	  and	  to	  launch	  an	  international	  fact-­‐finding	  mission	  to	  investigate	  the	  origins	  and	  course	  of	  the	  conflict”	  (Forsberg	  &	  Seppo	  pg.	  121).	  The	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  (UNSC)	  met	  on	  August	  9th	  during	  the	  Beijing	  Olympics	  after	  the	  initial	  offensives	  by	  Georgia	  and	  Russia	  on	  August	  7th	  and	  8th	  respectively.	  Multiple	  meetings	  were	  held	  by	  the	  UNSC,	  but	  a	  solution	  was	  not	  found	  due	  to	  Russia’s	  reluctance	  to	  a	  joint	  resolution	  with	  the	  UNSC	  (Forsberg	  &	  Seppo	  pg.	  125).	  Talks	  between	  Sarkozy,	  Russian	  diplomats	  and	  EU	  representatives	  resulted	  in	  an	  agreement	  on	  September	  8th	  to	  withdraw	  Russian	  troops	  from	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia.	  The	  Council	  of	  the	  EU	  was	  then	  able	  to	  establish	  a	  civilian	  European	  Union	  Monitoring	  Mission	  (EUMM)	  (Forsberg	  &	  Seppo	  pg.	  127).	  After	  the	  conflict,	  the	  EU	  also	  sponsored	  a	  rule	  of	  law	  mission	  (THEMIS)	  and	  a	  border	  support	  mission	  (EUSR	  BST)	  (Ibid.)	  Overall,	  the	  EU	  served	  as	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  impartial	  mediation	  in	  the	  conflict.	  	  	  The	  Russian	  government	  hoped	  to	  depict	  the	  Georgian	  government	  as	  undependable	  and	  erratic.	  Russia	  hoped	  to	  show	  the	  West	  the	  Georgia	  was	  not	  mature	  enough	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  organizations	  it	  so	  ardently	  strived	  for	  and	  used	  it	  as	  a	  warning	  to	  Ukraine	  to	  step	  away	  from	  its	  ambitious	  relationships	  with	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  NATO	  (Konoplyov).	  “The	  war	  was	  not	  only	  with	  Georgia	  —	  it	  also	  was	  a	  proxy	  war	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  Russia	  sent	  a	  clear	  signal	  that	  it	  believed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  had	  crossed	  the	  line	  in	  its	  support	  of	  Saakashvili	  and	  should	  back	  off”(Konoplyov).	  	  According	  to	  Stephen	  Blank,	  the	  Russian	  military	  gave	  the	  separatists	  weaponry	  and	  “gave	  passports	  to	  the	  citizens	  living	  in	  the	  provinces	  
so	  that	  it	  could	  claim	  with	  no	  justification	  that	  they	  were	  Russian	  citizens	  whom	  Moscow	  was	  obligated	  to	  defend.	  Russian	  forces	  in	  the	  provinces	  were	  hardly	  peacekeepers”	  (Blank	  pg.	  385).	  Pavel	  Felgengauer	  predicted	  that	  the	  Russian	  provocation	  in	  the	  separatist	  regions	  was	  planned	  in	  advance.	  Still	  the	  Russian	  government	  was	  cautious	  to	  avoid	  any	  serious	  conflict	  until	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  Georgia	  would	  not	  be	  given	  a	  Membership	  Action	  Plan	  by	  NATO	  (Sakwa	  pg.	  592).	  To	  Russia,	  this	  meant	  that	  it	  could	  attack	  Georgia	  without	  serious	  repercussions	  from	  the	  West	  (Whitmore).	  	  Below	  is	  a	  quote	  in	  Russian	  from	  an	  article	  Pavel	  Felgengauer	  wrote	  for	  the	  politics	  section	  of	  the	  “Новая	  Газета”	  with	  a	  translation	  of	  my	  own	  underneath.	  	  
 “В	  апреле	  на	  саммите	  НАТО	  в	  Бухаресте,	  в	  котором	  Путин	  принимал	  личное	  участие,	  стало	  ясно,	  что	  присоединение	  Грузии	  и	  Украины	  к	  альянсу,	  хоть	  пока	  решение	  отложено,	  неизбежно.	  Российские	  гражданские	  и	  военные	  начальники	  честно	  предупреждали	  как	  Запад,	  так	  и	  власти	  в	  Тбилиси	  и	  в	  Киеве,	  что	  попытки	  «затягивания	  в	  НАТО»	  (по	  словам	  наших	  дипломатов)	  стран,	  которые	  в	  Москве	  считают	  традиционной	  вотчиной,	  приведет	  к	  кризису.	  Было	  объявлено,	  что	  Россия	  «любыми	  средствами»	  не	  допустит	  вступления	  Грузии	  в	  НАТО,	  но	  на	  Михаила	  Саакашвили	  это	  не	  подействовало.	  Тогда	  события	  стали	  развиваться	  с	  нарастающей	  скоростью”(Felgengauer).	  	  
“At	  the	  NATO	  Summit	  in	  Bucharest	  April	  of	  2008,	  which	  Putin	  Attended,	  it	  was	  stated	  
that	  the	  decision	  of	  whether	  Georgia	  or	  Ukraine	  would	  be	  invited	  to	  join	  the	  
organization	  was	  postponed.	  At	  this	  summit,	  Russian	  military	  and	  government	  officials	  
warned	  the	  West,	  Kiev	  and	  Tbilisi	  that	  tightening	  relations	  with	  NATO,	  a	  traditional	  
enemy,	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  crisis.	  Russia	  stated	  that	  it	  would	  intervene	  “by	  any	  means”	  to	  
prevent	  Georgian	  membership	  in	  the	  NATO,	  but	  Mikhail	  Saakashvili	  did	  not	  back	  away.	  
From	  then	  on,	  events	  moved	  at	  a	  quick	  speed.”	  	  	  Translated	  by	  Chelsea	  Mickel	  	   Russia	  fears	  it	  will	  lose	  control	  of	  the	  Caucasus	  and	  other	  Former	  Soviet	  Republics.	  This	  fear	  is	  generated	  from	  the	  belief	  that	  if	  Russia	  is	  able	  to	  continue	  political	  dominance	  in	  the	  FSU,	  the	  Russian	  imperial	  dream	  will	  live	  on.	  This	  dream	  that	  Russia	  will	  return	  to	  greatness	  allows	  President	  Putin	  to	  have	  a	  hard	  line	  foreign	  policy,	  which	  he	  uses	  to	  assert	  control	  over	  nations	  that	  have	  been	  sovereign	  since	  the	  1990’s	  (Blank	  pg.	  387).	  In	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  James	  Traub	  commented	  that	  Russia	  appears	  to	  act	  like	  a	  19th	  century	  empire	  that	  seeks	  to	  expand	  its	  borders	  through	  military	  means.	  Russia	  is	  not	  afraid	  to	  manipulate	  nations	  in	  its	  sphere	  of	  influence	  into	  doing	  its	  bidding.	  It	  has	  readily	  been	  seen	  in	  the	  past	  that	  Ukraine	  faced	  oil	  and	  gas	  shortages	  that	  led	  many	  to	  die	  of	  hypothermia	  when	  in	  opposition	  with	  Russia,	  while	  Armenia	  was	  rewarded	  for	  its	  compliant	  behavior	  towards	  Russian	  policy	  (Traub).	  	  Georgia’s	  embrace	  of	  the	  West	  threatens	  Russia’s	  influence	  in	  the	  Caucasus,	  however,	  Georgia’s	  aspiration	  to	  join	  NATO	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  last	  straw;	  Russian	  
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov “threatened that Georgia’s ambition to join NATO 
‘will lead to renewed bloodshed,’ adding, as if that weren’t enough, ‘we will do 
anything not to allow Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO’” (Traub). Preceding the 
war in August, Russia staged a large military exercise and the Russian Fleet in the 
Black Sea was ready to support and deploy armed troops. Russian troops had rebuilt 
and repaired railway lines between Sukhumi and Ochamchira as well as the coastal 
railways so that Russian forces could be transported into Abkhazia if needed (Sakwa 
pg. 594). On	  the	  16th	  of	  April	  2008, only a few months before the war, President	  Putin	  “strengthened	  diplomatic	  and	  aid	  links	  with	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia;	  later	  that	  month	  Russia	  deployed	  over	  a	  thousand	  heavily	  armed	  additional	  troops	  to	  its	  part	  of	  the	  Joint	  Peacekeeping	  Forces	  without	  seeking	  Georgia’s	  consent”	  (Sakwa	  pg.	  594).	  	  	   	  
Conclusion	  With	  all	  of	  this	  evidence	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Russia	  had	  many	  reasons	  for	  its	  intervention	  in	  the	  separatist	  regions	  of	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia.	  Fearing	  for	  its	  territorial	  and	  influential	  integrity	  in	  the	  region,	  Russia	  saw	  the	  opportunity	  to	  demolish	  Georgian	  infrastructure	  and	  government	  so	  as	  to	  render	  it	  an	  inert	  threat.	  Georgia’s	  ambition	  to	  strengthen	  ties	  with	  the	  West	  and	  its	  accredited	  organizations	  led	  Russian	  officials	  to	  threaten	  Georgia	  with	  violence.	  Although	  these	  threats	  were	  seen	  as	  minimal	  by	  the	  West,	  they	  ultimately	  were	  realized.	  Russia	  arguably	  achieved	  its	  goals	  in	  the	  conflict.	  Russia’s	  management	  and	  military	  presence	  in	  Abkhazia	  secures	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  Black	  Sea	  Coast	  for	  Russia	  and	  allowed	  for	  a	  secure	  border	  for	  the	  Sochi	  Olympics	  (just	  north	  of	  Abkhazia)	  held	  in	  2014	  (Kakachia).	  However,	  if	  Russia’s	  ultimate	  goal	  was	  to	  regain	  control	  of	  the	  entirety	  of	  Georgia,	  it	  was	  not	  successful,	  as	  Georgia	  still	  pursues	  relations	  with	  the	  West	  and	  is	  unlikely	  to	  recognize	  the	  20%	  of	  its	  territory	  that	  lies	  in	  Russian	  and	  separatist	  hands.	  	  



























Crimea:	  Sovereign	  or	  Stalemate	  
	  
	   Recently,	  Ukraine	  has	  undergone	  a	  major	  political	  upheaval.	  The	  deposition	  of	  the	  formerly	  pro-­‐Russian	  government	  with	  a	  nationalist,	  western	  oriented	  one	  has	  led	  to	  violent	  protest	  in	  eastern	  Ukraine	  and	  the	  subsequent	  annexation	  by	  Russia	  of	  Crimea.	  Putin	  newly	  claimed	  that	  the	  annexation	  was	  planned	  weeks	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  referendum	  of	  self-­‐determination	  in	  Crimea;	  right	  after	  former	  President	  Victor	  Yanukovych	  was	  ousted	  (BBC	  News).	  The	  referendum	  succeeded	  due	  to	  the	  large	  Russian	  population	  there.	  The	  Ukrainian	  and	  Tatar	  populations	  in	  Crimea	  as	  well	  as	  many	  western	  nations	  are	  deeply	  concerned	  with	  this	  radical	  move	  of	  military	  aggression	  in	  the	  Former	  Soviet	  Union,	  fearing	  what	  it	  means	  for	  the	  future.	  	  This	  case	  study	  will	  outline	  the	  major	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  Russia’s	  decision	  to	  annex	  Crimea.	  These	  include	  military	  security,	  punishment	  for	  Ukrainian	  pro-­‐western	  ideology,	  and	  methodology	  to	  regain	  geo-­‐political	  importance.	  Russian	  involvement	  and	  a	  historical	  overview	  set	  the	  scene	  in	  order	  to	  interpret	  Russia’s	  foreign	  policy	  motives	  in	  Crimea.	  The	  significance	  of	  ethnic-­‐religious	  differences	  between	  the	  native	  Tatars	  and	  Russians/Ukrainians	  will	  be	  discussed	  to	  examine	  Russian	  bias	  against	  Turkic	  Muslims	  and	  show	  the	  diverse	  nature	  of	  the	  peninsula.	  To	  round	  off	  the	  discussion,	  Russian	  interests	  and	  international	  negotiations	  will	  be	  discussed,	  featuring	  worldwide	  condemnation	  of	  Russia’s	  actions.	  These	  aspects	  conclude	  that	  the	  Crimean	  Crisis	  is	  a	  warning	  to	  the	  western	  world	  of	  Russia’s	  capabilities	  and	  regained	  status	  as	  a	  world	  power.	   
	  
Russian	  Involvement	  	   Russia	  has	  pursued	  extensive	  involvement	  in	  Crimea	  since	  the	  1700’s	  when	  it	  conquered	  the	  region.	  Although	  Crimea	  briefly	  gained	  independence	  after	  the	  October	  Revolution,	  the	  peninsula,	  along	  with	  many	  of	  the	  other	  acquired	  territories	  of	  Russia,	  were	  quickly	  incorporated	  into	  the	  USSR	  after	  the	  communist	  party	  ascended	  to	  power.	  Russia	  values	  Crimea	  because	  of	  its	  fertile	  land	  and	  geographic	  position	  on	  the	  Black	  Sea	  coast.	  Although	  Russians	  view	  Crimea	  as	  part	  of	  the	  motherland,	  Crimea	  is	  far	  from	  homogenous.	  There	  are	  significant	  numbers	  of	  not	  only	  Ukrainians,	  but	  also	  Turkic	  Muslim	  minorities,	  most	  notably	  the	  Tatars,	  who	  consider	  Crimea	  their	  homeland.	  Before	  its	  annexation	  by	  Russia,	  Crimea	  was	  known	  as	  the	  Crimean	  Khanate,	  ruled	  as	  a	  successor	  state	  to	  the	  Golden	  Horde.	  The	  region	  then	  came	  under	  Ottoman	  control	  until	  it	  was	  liberated	  by	  the	  Russo-­‐Turkish	  treaty	  in	  1774	  and	  later	  annexed	  by	  Russia	  in	  1783	  (Spencer).	  The	  city	  of	  Sevastopol	  serves	  as	  a	  major	  seaport	  and	  the	  Black	  Sea	  offered	  Russia	  warm-­‐water	  access	  for	  its	  Navy,	  which	  continued	  to	  be	  stationed	  there	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  Black	  Sea	  lies	  near	  Russia’s	  southern	  border.	  “It	  provides	  Russia,	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  with	  a	  ‘window’	  on	  the	  warm	  Mediterranean	  waters,	  and	  beyond,	  it	  is	  the	  closest	  access	  to	  the	  world	  ocean	  for	  the	  Russian	  Navy	  and	  Russia’s	  merchant	  fleet”	  (Delanoe	  p.370).	  	  President	  Putin	  claims	  that	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR	  was	  “	  the	  biggest	  geo-­‐political	  catastrophe	  of	  the	  century”	  (Khalifa-­‐Zadeh).	  After	  Putin	  was	  elected	  2000,	  his	  mission	  has	  been	  to	  try	  “to	  recover	  for	  Russia	  political	  and	  geostrategic	  assets	  
that	  were	  lost	  by	  the	  USSR	  in	  1991.	  Putin	  is	  attempting	  to	  renew	  Russia’s	  status	  and	  influence	  in	  both	  regional	  and	  global	  politics,	  while	  claiming	  for	  the	  Russian	  Federation	  the	  same	  great	  power	  once	  wielded	  by	  the	  USSR”	  (Khalifa-­‐Zadeh).	  Crimea	  has	  come	  into	  the	  limelight	  in	  the	  past	  year	  following	  the	  massive	  Euromaidan	  protests	  that	  swept	  Ukraine	  and	  deposed	  the	  pro-­‐Russian	  Ukrainian	  president	  Viktor	  Yanukovych	  and	  replaced	  him	  with	  a	  western	  leaning	  government	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Petro	  Poroshenko.	  	  
	  
Historical	  Overview	  	  Crimea	  remains	  one	  of	  the	  most	  contentious	  and	  sought	  after	  pieces	  of	  land	  in	  history.	  Its	  ideal	  placement	  on	  the	  Black	  Sea	  and	  proximity	  to	  Russia	  has	  led	  the	  latter	  to	  claim	  ownership	  multiple	  times	  over	  the	  centuries.	  The	  ancient	  Greeks	  and	  Romans	  invaded	  its	  coasts,	  while	  the	  Ottomans,	  Mongolians,	  Bulgars,	  and	  finally,	  Russians	  conquered	  the	  landmass	  (Taylor).	  The	  eponymous	  "Crimea	  seems	  to	  have	  come	  from	  the	  language	  of	  the	  Crimean	  Tatars,	  a	  Turkic	  ethnic	  group	  that	  emerged	  during	  the	  Crimean	  Khanate.	  The	  Tatars	  called	  the	  peninsula	  Qırım”	  (Taylor).	  The	  Russian	  Empire	  annexed	  the	  region	  in	  1783,	  and	  attempted	  to	  rename	  it	  Taurica,	  however,	  the	  name	  Crimea	  was	  widely	  used	  and	  became	  official	  in	  1917	  (Taylor). 	  In	  1917	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Russian	  Empire	  following	  the	  October	  revolution,	  Crimea	  became	  an	  autonomous	  nation	  for	  a	  short	  period	  until	  it	  was	  caught	  up	  in	  the	  Russian	  civil	  war	  as	  a	  stronghold	  for	  the	  White	  Army.	  Crimea	  was	  incorporated	  into	  the	  USSR	  as	  an	  Autonomous	  Soviet	  Socialist	  Republic	  in	  1921.	  
During	  World	  War	  II,	  Crimea	  was	  caught	  up	  in	  the	  fighting	  and	  suffered	  traumatically.	  It	  was	  occupied	  by	  Nazi	  Germany	  and	  Sevastopol	  was	  greatly	  diminished	  due	  to	  heavy	  fighting	  and	  artillery.	  The	  Russian	  army	  regained	  Crimea	  in	  1944	  and	  heavily	  punished	  the	  Tatar	  population,	  stating	  that	  they	  had	  collaborated	  with	  the	  Nazis.	  “Following	  the	  liberation	  of	  Crimea	  from	  German	  invasion,	  the	  Soviet	  government	  embarked	  on	  an	  ambitious	  project	  to	  cleanse	  the	  area	  of	  non-­‐Slavic	  communities	  and	  therefore	  deported	  the	  Crimean	  Tatars”	  (Yesilot	  p.169).	  Nearly	  half	  of	  the	  Tatars	  deported	  died	  en	  route	  to	  Central	  Asia	  due	  to	  terrible	  conditions.	  The	  Tatar	  population	  was	  allowed	  to	  return	  only	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR	  (Taylor).	   In	  1954,	  Crimea	  was	  downgraded	  to	  an	  oblast	  (administrative	  region)	  in	  Russia.	  Nikita	  Khrushchev	  ceded	  the	  Crimean	  Oblast	  to	  Ukraine	  in	  1954.	  Khrushchev	  worked	  his	  way	  up	  through	  the	  Ukrainian	  Communist	  Party	  and	  may	  have	  felt	  a	  strong	  kinship	  for	  Ukraine.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  he	  gifted	  Crimea	  to	  Ukraine	  because	  of	  its	  fertile	  land	  as	  a	  reward	  for	  their	  great	  suffering	  in	  World	  War	  II.	  Crimea	  became	  an	  autonomous	  region	  within	  in	  Ukraine	  upon	  independence	  from	  the	  USSR	  in	  1991.	  Upon	  independence	  in	  December	  of	  1991, Ukraine	  held	  a	  referendum	  regarding	  liberation	  in	  which	  54%	  of	  Crimean	  voters	  opted	  for	  independence	  from	  Russia.	  Although	  this	  was	  a	  majority,	  it	  was	  the	  lowest	  majority	  voting	  in	  favor	  of	  independence	  in	  Ukraine.	  Succeeding	  a	  fleeting	  struggle	  with	  the	  “newly	  independent	  Ukrainian	  government,	  Crimea	  agreed	  to	  remain	  part	  of	  Ukraine,	  but	  with	  significant	  autonomy”(Taylor).	  The	  question	  of	  “Crimea’s	  geopolitical	  status	  received	  little	  attention	  prior	  to	  1990…the	  issue	  of	  Crimea’s	  relationship	  to	  Ukraine,	  
Russia,	  and	  the	  world	  still	  seemed	  far	  off	  on	  the	  horizon.	  In	  keeping	  with	  general	  trends	  throughout	  the	  USSR,	  there	  was	  strong	  popular	  support	  for	  increased	  political	  and	  economic	  autonomy	  for	  the	  region	  but	  these	  goals	  never	  extended	  to	  regional	  independence	  or	  renunciation	  of	  their	  affiliation	  with	  Ukraine.”	  (Dawson	  p.	  436).	  In	  1997,	  Ukraine	  and	  Russia	  “signed	  a	  bilateral	  Treaty	  on	  Friendship,	  Cooperation	  and	  Partnership,	  which	  formally	  allowed	  Russia	  to	  keep	  its	  Black	  Sea	  Fleet	  in	  Sevastopol”	  (Taylor).	  The	  region	  has	  been	  in	  the	  news	  frequently	  of	  late	  due	  to	  the	  invasion	  of	  Russian	  troops	  last	  year	  in	  March	  of	  2014.	  Russia	  annexed	  the	  Ukrainian	  territory,	  leading	  to	  national	  controversy.	  After	  the	  annexation,	  the	  Crimean	  population	  voted	  for	  independence	  from	  Ukraine.	  The	  vote	  passed	  due	  to	  the	  large	  number	  of	  ethnic	  Russians	  on	  the	  peninsula.	  Russia	  and	  Crimea	  signed	  a	  Treaty	  of	  Accession	  and	  Crimea	  was	  thereby	  absorbed	  into	  Russian	  territory,	  and	  is	  currently	  under	  de	  facto	  Russian	  control.	  	  (page	  break	  because	  of	  map	  below)	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Ethnicity	  and	  Religion:	  The	  Muslim-­‐Christian	  Divide	  	  The	  Crimean	  population	  is	  composed	  of	  58.8%	  ethnic	  Russians,	  24.2%	  Ukrainians	  and	  12.1%	  Crimean	  Tatars,	  with	  a	  collection	  of	  smaller	  ethnic	  groups,	  according	  to	  a	  Ukrainian	  census	  from	  2001	  (Lovasz).	  The	  Russian	  population	  primarily	  celebrates	  the	  Russian	  Orthodox	  religion,	  and	  Ukrainians	  celebrate	  eastern	  Orthodoxy	  as	  well.	  The	  Tatar	  population	  however,	  celebrates	  Islam	  and	  is	  ethnically	  Turkic,	  which	  has	  long	  been	  a	  point	  of	  contention	  with	  the	  Russian	  
government.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Tatars	  were	  allowed	  to	  return	  to	  Crimea	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR,	  they	  have	  continually	  been	  harassed	  and	  faced	  human	  rights	  violations.	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights	  Nils	  Muiznieks	  states	  that	  there	  have	  been	  mysterious	  incidents	  of	  “‘abductions’	  of	  civil	  society	  activists	  and	  attacks	  on	  Crimean	  Tatars,	  ethnic	  Ukrainians	  and	  people	  who	  have	  refused	  Russian	  citizenship	  since	  Russia	  annexed	  Ukraine’s	  Black	  Sea	  peninsula	  in	  March”	  (Lovasz).	  Local	  Crimean	  activists	  Leonid	  Korzh,	  Timur	  Shaimardanov,	  and	  Seiran	  Zinedinov	  have	  disappeared,	  and	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Council	  has	  started	  investigations	  into	  their	  disappearances	  (Lovasz).  Since	  the	  Brezhnev	  era	  and	  leading	  into	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  Era,	  “ethnic	  conflict	  has	  emerged	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  serious	  obstacles	  to	  democratization	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  the	  newly	  independent	  states	  of	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union”	  (Dawson).	  In	  Crimea,	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  ethnic	  tension	  comes	  from	  the	  various	  possibilities	  for	  delineating	  the	  region.	  The	  Organization	  of	  the	  Crimean	  Tatar	  National	  Movement	  (OKND)	  “has	  called	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Crimean	  Tatar	  state,	  which	  provides	  enhanced	  political	  rights	  to	  ethnic	  Crimean	  Tatars.	  However,	  the	  Russian	  Party	  of	  Crimea	  promotes	  the	  revitalization	  of	  an	  ethnic	  Russian	  national	  identity	  and	  supports	  privileges	  position	  for	  Russians	  in	  Crimea.	  Lastly,	  the	  Ukrainian	  National	  Assembly	  and	  the	  Ukrainian	  Republican	  Party	  maintain	  the	  Ukrainian-­‐ization	  of	  Crimea.	  Some	  even	  favor	  a	  pan-­‐Slavic	  identity	  for	  the	  peninsula	  (Dawson	  429).	  The	  Crimean	  Tatars’	  are	  able	  to	  trace	  their	  ancestries	  to	  the	  Crimea	  back	  to	  the	  1400’s.	  This	  has	  led	  the	  Tatars	  to	  label	  themselves	  as	  natives	  of	  the	  peninsula,	  much	  to	  the	  chagrin	  of	  ethnic	  Russians.	  Because	  of	  this,	  some	  believe	  that	  they	  




Russian	  Interests	  Ukraine	  has	  tried	  to	  ideologically	  deviate	  from	  Russian	  sentiments	  numerous	  times	  since	  gaining	  its	  independence	  in	  1991.	  	  However	  the	  “common	  history	  as	  well	  as	  the	  common	  source	  of	  identity	  still	  remain.	  Ukraine	  finds	  itself	  today	  in	  a	  
kind	  of	  discrepancy	  concerning	  its	  relations	  with	  the	  Russian	  Federation.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  it	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  ‘brother	  State’,	  sharing	  the	  same	  problems	  and	  being,	  therefore,	  a	  possible	  partner	  in	  finding	  solutions.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  Russia	  is	  regarded	  as	  former	  oppressor	  still	  trying	  to	  deter	  Ukraine	  from	  becoming	  a	  self-­‐confident,	  European	  State”	  (Wydra	  p.114).	  	  After	  Russia’	  successful	  annexation	  of	  Crimea,	  the	  Russian	  government	  is	  confident	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  influence	  Eastern	  Ukraine.	  	  President	  Putin	  says	  that	  he	  sees	  U.S.	  hegemony	  is	  a	  “pseudo-­‐occupation	  [that]	  we	  won’t	  put	  up	  with”	  (Putin).	  Russia	  has	  put	  pressure	  on	  the	  Baltic	  States	  of	  Latvia	  and	  Estonia,	  but	  its	  influence	  is	  small	  considering	  both	  nations	  are	  privy	  to	  the	  EU	  and	  NATO.	  NATO’s	  continued	  involvement	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  poses	  a	  large	  threat	  to	  Russian	  clout	  in	  its	  former	  territory.	  Former	  Ukrainian	  President	  Yanukovych	  was	  ousted	  by	  protests	  for	  his	  pro-­‐Russian	  leanings,	  and	  replaced	  with	  President	  Poroshenko,	  who	  favors	  the	  West,	  along	  with	  EU	  and	  NATO	  incorporation.	  Pro-­‐Russian	  activists	  and	  NGO’s	  “have	  been	  particularly	  influential	  elements	  in	  Russia’s	  foreign	  policy	  toward	  the	  Crimean	  peninsula”	  (Yesilot	  p.171).	  Following	  the	  recent	  “Maidan”	  Protests	  in	  Kiev	  and	  the	  subsequent	  deposition	  of	  former	  president	  Yanukovych	  before	  Russia	  annexed	  Crimea,	  pro-­‐Russian	  groups	  “protested	  the	  Ukrainian	  government’s	  ultra-­‐nationalist	  policies	  and	  sought	  to	  justify	  their	  separatist	  campaigns	  based	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  Ukrainian	  authorities	  had	  been	  unwilling	  to	  recognize	  and	  protect	  their	  cultural	  rights”	  (Yesilot	  p.171).	  Pro-­‐Russian	  rebels	  have	  actively	  revolted	  against	  the	  current	  regime	  in	  eastern	  Ukraine,	  which	  has	  a	  large	  Russian	  population.	  The	  regions	  of	  Donetsk	  and	  Luhansk	  have	  been	  
especially	  vulnerable	  to	  this	  violence	  and	  “it	  was	  the	  opposition	  to…nationalist	  policies	  that	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  pro-­‐Russian	  rallies	  and	  gatherings	  in	  the	  Ukraine”	  (Yesilot	  p.171).	  	   The	  annexation	  of	  Crimea	  and	  subsequent	  violence	  in	  eastern	  Ukraine	  is	  a	  result	  of	  three	  motives	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Russian	  government:	  punishment,	  protection	  of	  ethnic	  Russians,	  and	  naval	  security.	  Russia	  views	  Ukraine’s	  pro-­‐western	  orientation	  as	  a	  betrayal	  by	  their	  cultural	  brother	  and	  hence	  it	  seeks	  to	  punish	  its	  former	  ally	  by	  threatening	  its	  territorial	  sovereignty.	  Russia	  often	  cites	  the	  interest	  of	  ethnic	  Russian	  when	  its	  takes	  military	  action	  in	  the	  post	  Soviet	  space.	  Crimea	  falls	  in	  line	  with	  this	  pattern.	  Russia	  stated	  concern	  for	  the	  large	  Russian	  population	  in	  Crimea,	  which	  comprises	  almost	  60%	  of	  the	  total	  inhabitants	  on	  the	  peninsula.	  The	  Crimean	  Peninsula	  is	  located	  at	  a	  critical	  and	  strategic	  crossroads	  that	  bisects	  the	  east-­‐west	  and	  north-­‐south	  corridors.	  Its	  ideal	  location	  on	  the	  Black	  Sea	  has	  led	  to	  intense	  Russian	  and	  international	  interest.	  Russian	  naval	  access	  to	  the	  Black	  Sea	  is	  paramount	  to	  Russian	  security,	  both	  economically	  and	  militarily	  (Lawler).	  Taking	  into	  consideration	  its	  concerns	  for	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  security,	  Russia	  has	  begun	  a	  rigorous	  modernization	  program	  for	  its	  military	  called	  the	  State	  Armament	  Program	  (SAP	  2011-­‐2020).	  Improvement	  the	  “Russian	  Black	  Sea	  Fleet	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  ambitious	  parts	  of	  it,	  with	  the	  expected	  commissioning	  of	  15–18	  new	  units	  (Boltenkov	  p.	  82)	  The	  implementation	  of	  this	  program	  enables	  the	  “modernization	  and	  development	  of	  Black	  Sea	  and	  Mediterranean	  naval	  facilities,	  reminding	  the	  strategic	  interests	  of	  the	  region	  for	  Moscow,	  as	  a	  nexus	  between	  Russia	  and	  the	  Mediterranean,	  the	  Middle	  East,	  and	  
beyond,	  the	  world	  ocean”	  (Delanoe	  p.368).	  The	  Crimean	  Crisis	  emphasizes	  the	  “maritime	  dimension	  of	  Black	  Sea	  security”	  as	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  Russian	  government’s	  aims	  to	  re-­‐establish	  itself	  as	  a	  world	  power	  and	  shows	  a	  “still-­‐predominant	  pattern	  of	  the	  use	  of	  hard	  power	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  analysis	  of	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  factors	  in	  the	  light	  of	  Russia’s	  recent	  takeover	  of	  Crimea	  suggests	  that	  Moscow’s	  maritime	  power	  is	  likely	  to	  increase	  in	  the	  Black	  Sea	  in	  the	  short	  term”	  (Delanoe	  p.379).	  	  President	  Putin	  has	  another	  reason	  for	  making	  the	  decision	  he	  did	  concerning	  Crimea.	  Russia	  faces	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  domestic	  issue,	  including	  corruption,	  poor	  living	  standards	  and	  a	  suffering	  economy.	  Crimea	  has	  long	  been	  considered	  a	  region	  that	  is	  important	  to	  Russian	  heritage	  as	  wealthy	  Russians	  vacationed	  there	  and	  Pushkin	  and	  other	  famous	  writers	  traveled	  there	  for	  inspiration.	  When	  President	  Putin	  addressed	  audiences	  from	  the	  Kremlin,	  “attendees	  in	  Red	  Square	  said	  they	  felt	  pride	  in	  their	  resurgent	  country	  and	  in	  Putin	  for	  his	  decisive	  actions	  on	  the	  world	  stage…Putin's	  power	  play	  in	  Ukraine	  has	  been	  enormously	  popular	  at	  home,	  with	  79%	  of	  Russians	  in	  favor	  of	  Crimea	  joining	  Russia…[and]	  Putin's	  approval	  rating	  has	  reached	  a	  three-­‐year	  high	  of	  71.6%”	  (Luhn).	  Irina	  Makarova,	  a	  working	  class	  Muscovite	  attending	  Putin’s	  address,	  stated	  that	  "I	  am	  proud	  to	  be	  Russian	  and	  proud	  of	  Putin,	  proud	  that	  he	  didn't	  back	  down	  and	  kept	  Crimea,"	  she	  said.	  "For	  a	  long	  time,	  we	  didn't	  know	  what	  kind	  of	  country	  we	  were	  living	  in	  and	  where	  it	  was	  going.	  Now	  a	  new	  confidence	  in	  our	  country	  has	  appeared"	  (Luhn).	  	  
In	  conclusion,	  Putin’s	  memorandum	  to	  the	  now	  sovereign	  nations	  that	  once	  comprised	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  most	  significantly	  Ukraine,	  remains	  the	  same:	  “If	  they	  go	  West,	  Russia	  will	  dismember	  them	  and	  prevent	  them	  from	  regaining	  their	  sovereignty.	  Since	  the	  conflicts	  can	  always	  be	  used	  to	  stage	  various	  provocations,	  Moscow	  can	  use	  its	  influence	  to	  keep	  these	  countries	  weak	  and	  vulnerable”	  (Cornell).	  How	  the	  West	  responds	  to	  this	  with	  the	  incorporation	  of	  international	  and	  regional	  organizations	  is	  still	  in	  progress.	  Candid	  communication	  between	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  European	  Union,	  and	  Russia	  is	  necessary	  to	  resolve	  the	  conflict.	  However,	  since	  it	  is	  in	  Russia’s	  interest	  to	  foment	  violence	  and	  discord,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  resolution	  is	  null,	  and	  Crimea	  will	  doubtlessly	  join	  the	  large	  number	  of	  post-­‐Soviet	  frozen	  conflicts.	  
 	  International	  Negotiations	  
	   The	  Black	  Sea	  region	  is	  a	  culturally	  heterogeneous	  region,	  and	  the	  “absence	  of	  effective	  regional	  security	  mechanisms	  have	  so	  far	  precluded	  the	  stakeholders	  from	  preventing,	  diffusing	  or	  settling	  any	  security	  issues”	  (Delanoe	  p.367).	  Crimea	  lies	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  region	  that	  has	  turned	  into	  a	  competition	  field	  between	  major	  regional	  and	  international	  actors	  with	  antagonistic	  interests.	  Since	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSE,	  	  “Russia,	  Turkey,	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU),	  the	  USA	  and	  NATO	  have	  turned	  the	  region	  into	  a	  ‘zero	  sum	  game’	  area.	  Rising	  tensions	  and	  security	  challenges	  have	  subsequently	  led	  to	  permanent	  growth	  in	  military	  spending	  among	  Black	  Sea	  states	  during	  the	  past	  decade”	  (Delanoe	  p.367).	  In	  light	  of	  Russia’s	  recent	  and	  controversial	  annexation	  of	  Crimea,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  have	  
imposed	  sanctions	  on	  influential	  Russian	  political	  and	  economic	  elites	  as	  well	  as	  	  	  companies	  (Lovasz).	  Recent	  negotiations	  between	  major	  world	  leaders	  in	  Munich	  have	  come	  to	  a	  standstill.	  The	  negotiations	  have	  focused	  mainly	  on	  the	  increasing	  violence	  in	  Eastern	  Ukraine,	  but	  relate	  to	  Crimea	  as	  the	  West	  hopes	  to	  stop	  violence	  in	  the	  region	  and	  return	  Crimea	  to	  Ukrainian	  control.	  German	  chancellor	  Angela	  Merkel	  has	  met	  with	  French	  President	  François	  Hollande,	  Russian	  Foreign	  Minister	  Sergei	  Lavrov,	  and	  United	  States	  Secretary	  of	  State	  John	  Kerry	  to	  discuss	  Russian	  military	  involvement	  in	  Ukraine	  (Doroshev,	  Rudnitsky).	  Russia	  has	  been	  supplying	  arms	  to	  pro-­‐Russian	  sympathizers	  in	  Eastern	  Ukraine	  and	  its	  army	  facilitated	  the	  takeover	  of	  Crimea.	   	  NATO,	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States	  have	  discussed	  ways	  to	  negate	  Russian	  influence	  in	  the	  region.	  While	  some	  American	  congressmen	  advocate	  for	  arming	  Ukrainian	  rebels,	  chancellor	  Merkel	  refuses	  to	  follow	  this	  strategy,	  citing	  United	  States	  disastrous	  experience	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  using	  the	  same	  tactics.	  President	  Obama	  remains	  skeptical	  of	  the	  idea	  as	  well	  (Doroshev,	  Rudnitsky).	  Currently	  “NATO	  is	  setting	  up	  military	  headquarters	  and	  command	  centers	  from	  the	  Baltic	  to	  the	  Black	  seas	  along	  Russia’s	  borders	  and	  plans	  to	  ultimately	  field	  a	  rapid-­‐reaction	  force	  of	  30,000	  troops	  as	  relations	  with	  the	  Kremlin	  have	  deteriorated”	  (Doroshev,	  Rudnitsky).	  Lamberto	  Zannier,	  who	  is	  the	  head	  of	  the	  OCSE,	  stated	  in	  an	  interview	  on	  February	  8th,	  2015	  that	  “we	  see	  the	  emergence	  of	  dividing	  lines”	  in	  a	  “very	  polarized	  environment”	  (Neuger).	  	  President	  Putin’s	  policy	  regarding	  Ukraine	  is	  “directly	  drawn	  from	  Russia’s	  experiences	  manipulating	  internal	  conflicts	  to	  divide	  and	  rule	  across	  Russia’s	  





Conclusions	  The	  annexation	  of	  Crimea	  by	  Russia	  may	  cause	  a	  “domino	  effect	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  former	  Soviet	  countries.	  In	  particular,	  this	  applies	  to	  the	  Georgian	  breakaway	  territories	  of	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia.	  Their	  limited	  and	  illusory	  political	  independence	  could	  be	  scrapped	  and	  they	  may	  officially	  become	  part	  of	  Russia,	  therefore	  further	  deepening	  the	  crisis	  in	  the	  South	  Caucasus	  and	  in	  relations	  between	  Russia	  and	  the	  West”	  (Dzutsev).	  “The	  creation	  of	  another	  semi-­‐recognized	  territory	  and	  a	  change	  of	  official	  borders	  signifies	  a	  crisis	  in	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  world	  that	  threatens	  to	  develop	  further,	  undermining	  the	  existing	  status-­‐quo	  in	  variety	  of	  ways”	  (Dzutsev).	  	  	  Forthright	  discussions	  regarding	  frozen	  conflicts	  and	  especially	  the	  Crimea	  Crisis	  could	  take	  the	  wind	  out	  of	  Putin’s	  metaphorical	  sail,	  as	  he	  relies	  on	  the	  inability	  of	  western	  nations	  to	  make	  firm	  decisions	  and	  decisive	  action	  to	  wield	  his	  impervious	  sword.	  	  More	  specifically,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  outline	  some	  strategies	  that	  would	  help	  diffuse	  the	  situation	  in	  eastern	  Ukraine	  and	  Crimea.	  First,	  the	  response	  must	  be	  regional	  in	  nature,	  reassuring	  Ukrainian	  citizens	  that	  the	  conflict	  plaguing	  their	  homeland	  will	  not	  damage	  their	  future	  relations	  with	  the	  west	  (Cornell).	  Providing	  troops	  is	  not	  a	  viable	  option	  at	  the	  present	  due	  to	  disagreements	  between	  the	  US,	  Germany,	  and	  France	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  provide	  military	  forces	  to	  intervene	  in	  Eastern	  Ukraine	  and	  Crimea.	  The	  EU	  and	  NATO,	  should	  make	  clear	  to	  Ukraine	  that	  membership	  in	  either	  organization	  is	  still	  possible.	  If	  Ukraine	  does	  join	  one	  of	  these	  organizations,	  Russia	  could	  be	  dragged	  un-­‐preparedly	  into	  a	  much	  larger	  conflict	  than	  it	  was	  expecting,	  and	  facing	  much	  stronger	  adversaries.	  	  































“Whatever	  else	  one	  may	  feel	  about	  Russia’s	  status	  in	  contemporary	  world	  politics,	  
there	  is	  no	  escaping	  the	  realization	  that	  Moscow	  will	  continue	  to	  exercise	  considerable	  
geopolitical	  importance	  within	  the	  European	  continent	  and	  will	  play	  an	  important	  
role	  in	  the	  negotiation	  of	  the	  new	  international	  order	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world.”	  	  (Polikanov	  &	  Timmins	  p.	  223)	  	  	  	  
Conclusions:	  
	   The	  conclusion	  section	  will	  be	  broken	  into	  a	  series	  of	  three	  parts.	  The	  first	  section	  will	  summarize	  the	  similarities	  between	  the	  circumstances	  and	  actions	  of	  Russian	  aggression	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  region.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  I	  will	  elucidate	  how	  Russian	  intents	  revolve	  around	  its	  shroud	  of	  security.	  Security	  threats	  are	  Russia’s	  main	  concern,	  and	  can	  be	  broken	  up	  into	  three	  parts	  political,	  economic,	  and	  Soviet	  kinship.	  The	  three	  subjects	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive	  but	  complimentary	  and	  often	  coincide	  with	  each	  other.	  	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  text	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  distinctive	  qualities	  of	  each	  of	  the	  three	  case	  studies.	  This	  will	  help	  show	  readers	  that	  although	  the	  Russian	  government	  focuses	  on	  key	  issues	  when	  making	  foreign	  policy	  decisions,	  each	  situation	  is	  unique,	  as	  Russia	  has	  individual	  concerns	  with	  each	  of	  the	  nations	  represented.	  In	  understanding	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  case	  studies,	  the	  reader	  can	  gage	  Russia’s	  main	  concern	  with	  the	  area	  of	  interest,	  thus	  explaining	  Russian	  actions	  in	  the	  region.	  Looking	  at	  the	  dissimilarities	  grants	  the	  analyst	  a	  fuller	  picture	  of	  Russian	  priorities	  and	  concerns.	  	  The	  final	  section	  of	  the	  conclusion	  will	  outline	  the	  lessons	  that	  can	  be	  learned	  from	  analyzing	  Russian	  aggression	  in	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh,	  South	  Ossetia,	  Abkhazia,	  and	  Crimea.	  Various	  lessons	  will	  be	  assessed.	  First	  is	  the	  east-­‐west	  dichotomy,	  or	  
Russian	  methodology	  in	  handling	  the	  West	  through	  controversial	  ‘land-­‐grabs’	  in	  order	  to	  annihilate	  western-­‐oriented	  international	  organizations	  and	  investment	  in	  its	  ‘near	  abroad’.	  Second,	  that	  the	  Russian	  government	  will	  act	  in	  any	  way	  that	  will	  garner	  domestic	  approval,	  and	  interventionism	  is	  extremely	  popular	  at	  home.	  Third,	  Russia’s	  egoism	  as	  prime	  motivator	  for	  foreign	  policy	  moves.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  discuss	  potential	  options	  for	  future	  negotiations	  between	  Russia	  and	  the	  West.	  These	  topics	  coalesce	  into	  one	  major	  concern:	  what	  is	  Russia’s	  fate	  in	  the	  Post	  Soviet	  world?	  This	  is	  not	  a	  question	  that	  can	  be	  answered,	  but	  it	  is	  relevant	  because	  it	  is	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  every	  Russian	  elite	  and	  citizen.	  	  	  
What	  is	  similar?	  	  When	  thinking	  about	  Russian	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  policy	  decisions,	  security	  is	  always	  an	  important	  feature	  to	  consider.	  The	  main	  objectives	  Russian	  officials	  consider	  in	  their	  decision	  to	  use	  military	  force	  in	  each	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  can	  be	  broken	  into	  three	  main	  sections.	  These	  are,	  political	  influence,	  and	  economic	  security,	  and	  the	  preeminence	  of	  soviet	  kinship	  ties.	  Soviet	  kinship	  characterizes	  Russia’s	  social	  domination	  and	  sentimental	  ties	  to	  its	  fellow	  republics	  during	  the	  20th	  century.	  This	  has	  remained	  influential	  after	  the	  breakup	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Russian	  foreign	  policy	  concepts	  reveal	  a	  “hierarchy	  of	  regional	  prioritization	  in	  which	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  space	  remains	  the	  top	  priority”	  (Monaghan	  p.3).	  	  	  
Political	  Influence	  
The	  first	  security	  concern	  for	  Russia	  is	  its	  diminishing	  political	  influence	  in	  the	  former	  Soviet	  republics,	  especially	  the	  Caucasus.	  Russia	  aims	  to	  create	  discontent	  and	  disorder	  in	  the	  former	  republics	  so	  that	  it	  can	  assert	  political	  guise	  over	  the	  incumbent	  governments.	  In	  Georgia,	  Azerbaijan,	  and	  Crimea,	  Russia	  asserts	  its	  political	  clout	  by	  undermining	  government	  sovereignty.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia,	  Russia	  aided	  the	  separatists	  to	  punish	  the	  Georgian	  government	  for	  its	  pro-­‐western	  leanings	  and	  ambition	  to	  join	  NATO	  and	  the	  EU.	  The	  Russian	  government	  warned	  that	  not	  only	  could	  it	  actively	  seize	  their	  land,	  but	  also	  that	  Russia	  was	  able	  and	  willing	  to	  destroy	  Georgian	  sovereignty,	  if	  it	  showed	  preference	  to	  western	  nations	  over	  Russia.	  Russia	  also	  feared	  its	  territorial	  integrity.	  Abkhaz	  and	  Ossetian	  minorities	  reside	  in	  Russian	  territory	  in	  the	  North	  Caucasus,	  notorious	  for	  its	  instability.	  Russia	  did	  not	  want	  to	  provoke	  minorities	  in	  its	  own	  territory,	  fearing	  they	  would	  seek	  to	  separate	  from	  Russia	  and	  join	  their	  ethnic	  brethren	  in	  forming	  new	  nations.	  Russia	  took	  the	  opportunity	  to	  damage	  Georgian	  infrastructure	  and	  government	  while	  strengthening	  the	  separatists	  in	  order	  to	  impede	  any	  uproar	  in	  the	  Northern	  Caucasus	  that	  could	  threaten	  its	  political	  and	  military	  sovereignty	  in	  the	  region.	  Concerning	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh,	  the	  Russian	  government	  sought	  to	  assert	  its	  political	  power	  over	  Azerbaijan	  in	  order	  to	  counterbalance	  extensive	  western	  involvement	  in	  the	  area.	  Russia	  hoped	  to	  benefit	  from	  Azerbaijan’s	  profitable	  natural	  resource	  sector,	  but	  western	  oil	  and	  gas	  companies	  were	  taking	  home	  the	  profit	  instead.	  Russian	  officials	  felt	  that,	  as	  with	  Georgia,	  Azerbaijan	  was	  allowing	  too	  much	  western	  investment	  in	  its	  territory,	  and	  aimed	  to	  disrupt	  Azerbaijan’s	  
relative	  success	  by	  sending	  Russian	  troops	  to	  intervene	  and	  help	  the	  adversary.	  The	  goal	  was	  to	  cause	  damage	  to	  Azerbaijani	  infrastructure	  and	  cause	  western	  companies	  to	  be	  reticent	  about	  investing	  in	  Azerbaijan.	  Russian	  officials	  aided	  Armenia	  so	  as	  to	  show	  Azerbaijan	  that	  Russia	  still	  had	  power	  that	  could	  influence	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  Azerbaijani	  government	  despite	  their	  strong	  economy.	  In	  Crimea,	  Russia’s	  annexation	  of	  the	  peninsula	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  political	  threat	  to	  Ukraine.	  Ukraine	  recently	  ousted	  pro-­‐Russian	  leader	  Yanukovych	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  western	  leaning	  official.	  The	  Russian	  government	  fuels	  unrest	  in	  Eastern	  Ukraine	  and	  Crimea	  in	  order	  to	  affirm	  the	  superiority	  of	  its	  political	  prowess.	  This	  aggressive	  military	  move	  also	  suggests	  to	  the	  west	  that	  Russia	  views	  itself	  as	  an	  influential	  world	  power	  and	  must	  be	  taken	  seriously.	  Russia	  frequently	  exhibits	  its	  political	  clout	  in	  the	  region	  by	  making	  controversial	  moves	  against	  the	  incumbent	  governments	  in	  the	  FSU,	  often	  resorting	  to	  force,	  and	  Crimea	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  this.	  	  
Economic	  Security	  All	  three	  case	  studies	  focus	  on	  instances	  where	  Russian	  economic	  security	  was	  in	  question.	  President	  Putin	  pursues	  a	  “pragmatic	  policy	  with	  sound	  economic	  interests	  underpinning	  the	  process	  of	  decision-­‐making”	  (Polikanov	  &	  Timmins	  p.	  227-­‐8).	  Although	  Russia	  has	  vast	  amounts	  of	  crude	  oil	  and	  other	  natural	  resources	  within	  its	  territory,	  Russia	  has	  always	  been	  dependent	  on	  its	  surrounding	  states	  (once	  republics)	  to	  acquire	  cheap	  gods	  and	  diversify	  its	  fledgling	  economy.	  	  	  
Azerbaijan	  has	  a	  prevalent	  natural	  gas	  and	  oil	  reserve	  along	  its	  Caspian	  Sea	  coastline.	  Azerbaijan’s	  economic	  success	  in	  some	  ways	  aided	  Russia’s	  economy	  because	  they	  were	  able	  to	  have	  access	  to	  certain	  offshore	  drilling.	  However,	  extensive	  western	  investment	  lessened	  Russia’s	  profit	  and	  importance	  in	  world	  trade	  and	  thus	  Russia	  felt	  economically	  threatened	  by	  the	  west	  more	  so	  than	  Azerbaijan.	  Russia	  intervened	  in	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  with	  the	  hopes	  of	  weakening	  the	  Azerbaijani	  government	  and	  economy	  to	  the	  point	  where	  they	  were	  more	  receptive	  to	  Russian	  policy	  and	  veered	  away	  from	  its	  western	  orientation.	  	  Crimea	  served	  as	  an	  economic	  opportunity	  for	  Russia	  because	  of	  its	  direct	  access	  to	  the	  Black	  Sea.	  Taking	  away	  one	  of	  Ukraine’s	  most	  fertile	  land	  holdings	  gives	  Russia	  the	  ability	  to	  hurt	  the	  Ukrainian	  economy.	  Russia	  fears	  that	  as	  Ukraine	  becomes	  more	  western	  oriented,	  they	  will	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  conduit	  point	  for	  Russian	  oil.	  Ukrainian	  independence	  is	  a	  detriment	  to	  the	  Russian	  economy	  because	  Ukraine	  was	  one	  of	  Russia’s	  largest	  trading	  partners,	  and	  political	  allies.	  Losing	  such	  an	  important	  source	  of	  regional	  control	  could	  not	  only	  be	  damaging	  to	  domestic	  approval,	  but	  challenging	  in	  terms	  of	  maintaining	  control	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  region.	  	  Georgia	  is	  important	  to	  Russia’s	  economic	  interests	  because	  it	  transports	  Russian	  and	  Central	  Asian	  oil	  to	  Europe.	  Although	  Georgia	  is	  not	  a	  wealthy	  nation,	  it	  has	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  nationalism	  and	  identity	  that	  makes	  Russian	  influence	  difficult	  take	  hold.	  The	  Russian	  government	  aided	  the	  separatists	  in	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia	  in	  order	  to	  weaken	  the	  Georgian	  economy	  and	  henceforth	  make	  the	  nation	  more	  dependent	  on	  Russia.	  This	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  effective,	  as	  Georgia	  
still	  pursues	  a	  western-­‐oriented	  foreign	  policy	  and	  transports	  oil	  from	  the	  Caucasus	  and	  Central	  Asia	  that	  bypasses	  Russia	  and	  so	  is	  a	  detriment	  to	  the	  Russian	  economy.	  	  	  
Soviet	  Kinship	  and	  Sentimentality	  The	  Russian	  government	  often	  pursues	  a	  foreign	  policy	  of	  interventionism	  and	  irredentism	  in	  order	  to	  exert	  its	  Soviet	  primacy	  and	  kinship	  ties	  with	  its	  former	  republics.	  In	  all	  three	  case	  studies	  (Georgia,	  Azerbaijan,	  and	  Crimea)	  Russia	  took	  military	  action	  in	  a	  region	  where	  it	  was	  not	  the	  sovereign	  governing	  body.	  Russia’s	  actions	  can	  be	  boiled	  down	  to	  an	  important	  psychological	  belief	  that	  Soviet	  kinship	  and	  dominance	  are	  still	  influential	  in	  the	  ‘near	  abroad’;	  what	  westerners	  know	  as	  the	  Former	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  Soviet	  period	  lasted	  for	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  time.	  Over	  the	  various	  decades	  of	  Russian	  dominance,	  Russian	  culture	  took	  root	  in	  many	  of	  the	  republics.	  Even	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR,	  the	  new	  nations	  struggled	  to	  find	  a	  sovereign	  identity	  apart	  from	  their	  oppressor.	  	  For	  instance,	  Crimea	  was	  and	  still	  is	  ethnically	  dominated	  by	  Russians	  despite	  being	  given	  to	  Ukraine	  upon	  its	  independence,	  because	  the	  native	  Tatars	  were	  forcibly	  moved	  to	  Central	  Asia	  and	  not	  allowed	  to	  return	  until	  the	  1990’s.	  Since	  Russians	  comprise	  the	  ethnic	  majority	  in	  Crimea,	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Accession	  passed,	  much	  to	  the	  chagrin	  of	  both	  the	  Tatar	  and	  Ukrainian	  population.	  Russia’s	  annexation	  of	  Crimea	  has	  led	  the	  Tatar	  population	  to	  justifiably	  fear	  ill	  treatment	  and	  bias.	  	  	  In	  the	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  conflict,	  Russian	  cultural	  influence	  is	  subtler.	  Since	  there	  is	  no	  Russian	  population	  in	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh,	  the	  Russian	  forces	  aided	  their	  Eastern	  Orthodox	  brethren	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  Muslim	  Azerbaijanis’	  as	  other.	  
Russian	  cultural	  influence	  was	  not	  strong	  in	  Azerbaijan	  upon	  independence	  because	  of	  its	  blossoming	  natural	  resource	  economy	  and	  nationalist	  intellectual	  elite.	  However,	  in	  Armenia,	  Russian	  influence	  is	  still	  strong,	  and	  the	  Russian	  government	  exploited	  this	  fact	  to	  punish	  Azerbaijan	  for	  their	  willful	  independence	  from	  Russian	  influence.	  In	  Georgia,	  Soviet	  cultural	  influence	  was	  waning	  and	  being	  replaced	  by	  pro-­‐western	  sentiment	  and	  a	  desire	  to	  join	  international	  organizations	  that	  Russia	  is	  opposed	  to,	  mainly	  NATO	  and	  the	  EU.	  Thus,	  Georgian	  intervention	  in	  the	  separatist	  republics	  and	  recognizing	  their	  sovereignty	  showed	  Georgia	  the	  limit	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  nationalist,	  western	  ideologies	  that	  they	  could	  adopt	  before	  facing	  Russian	  aggression.	  Soviet	  culture	  and	  Russian	  supremacy	  is	  present	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  Russian	  government	  fears	  losing	  control	  of	  the	  Caucasus.	  Russia	  believes	  that	  if	  it	  is	  able	  to	  continue	  its	  cultural	  influence	  in	  these	  territories,	  the.	  Imperial	  continue	  to	  be	  relevant.	  This	  dream	  that	  Russia	  will	  return	  to	  greatness	  fuels	  the	  autocratic	  government	  	  
What	  is	  different?	  This	  section	  addresses	  the	  singularities	  of	  each	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  researched.	  The	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  conflict	  it	  noted	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  ethnic	  Russians	  in	  the	  area.	  Russia	  usually	  intervenes	  in	  the	  former	  Soviet	  space	  claiming	  that	  the	  welfare	  of	  ethnic	  Russians	  is	  being	  compromised.	  Also	  notable	  is	  the	  Azerbaijani	  perception	  of	  Russia	  as	  a	  Christian	  aggressor	  aiding	  its	  brethren	  against	  a	  secular	  Muslim	  nation.	  Georgia	  is	  singular	  in	  its	  lack	  of	  natural	  resources,	  and	  also	  its	  
ambition	  to	  join	  NATO	  and	  the	  EU,	  a	  significant	  factor	  that	  heavily	  contributed	  to	  Russia’s	  decision	  to	  intervene	  in	  their	  separatist	  regions.	  Crimea	  stands	  unique	  among	  the	  case	  studies	  because	  Russian	  military	  intervention	  was	  not	  used	  to	  aid	  in	  an	  existing	  conflict,	  but	  to	  annex	  a	  sovereign	  territory	  of	  Ukraine.	  Each	  of	  these	  peculiarities	  will	  be	  explained	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  	  	  
Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  Conflict	  A	  substantial	  amount	  of	  Russia’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  conflict	  was	  in	  the	  form	  of	  international	  negotiations,	  most	  prominently	  with	  the	  Minsk	  Group.	  Many	  experts	  and	  regional	  media	  sources	  state	  that	  Russian	  forces	  participated	  in	  the	  conflict	  on	  the	  side	  of	  ethnic	  Armenians.	  An	  important	  factor	  on	  the	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  conflict	  is	  that	  there	  are	  no	  ethnic	  Russians	  in	  the	  region.	  Russia	  aided	  Armenia	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  Azerbaijan	  in	  order	  to	  weaken	  Azerbaijan’s	  political	  control	  and	  economic	  revenue,	  not	  to	  protect	  ethnic	  Russians,	  which	  is	  unique	  among	  many	  of	  Russia’s	  previous	  military	  endeavors.	  Russia	  hoped	  to	  cripple	  the	  Azerbaijani	  government,	  which	  the	  former	  saw	  as	  unfaithful,	  and	  reward	  the	  relatively	  weak	  Armenian	  government,	  who	  was	  far	  more	  dependent	  on	  Russia	  for	  its	  economic	  and	  political	  policies.	  	  Another	  factor	  that	  influenced	  Russia’s	  decision	  to	  impose	  itself	  militarily	  in	  the	  conflict	  was	  the	  Muslim-­‐Christian	  dichotomy.	  Russia	  defended	  its	  Eastern	  Orthodox	  brethren	  against	  a	  majority	  Muslim,	  Turkic	  nation,	  which	  many	  argue,	  was	  consequential	  in	  Russia’s	  decision	  to	  send	  troops	  to	  aid	  the	  Armenians.	  Some	  analysts	  and	  many	  Azerbaijanis’	  postulate	  
that	  this	  was	  Christian	  aggression	  against	  the	  unsubstantiated	  but	  willingly	  perceived	  threat	  of	  Muslim	  extremism.	  	  	  
Russo-­‐Georgian	  War	  Russia	  became	  involved	  in	  Georgia’s	  battle	  with	  its	  separatist	  regions	  South	  Ossetia	  and	  Abkhazia	  due	  to	  their	  strategic	  location	  along	  the	  north	  Caucasus	  and	  Black	  Sea.	  Unlike	  Crimea	  and	  Azerbaijan,	  Georgia	  does	  not	  have	  natural	  resources	  that	  Russia	  wishes	  to	  take	  advantage	  of.	  Instead,	  Russia	  sees	  Georgia	  as	  a	  competing	  conduit	  point	  for	  moving	  natural	  resources	  from	  Central	  Asia	  and	  the	  Caucasus	  to	  Europe.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  however	  that	  neither	  of	  the	  ethnic	  minorities	  breaking	  away	  from	  Georgia	  was	  Muslim	  or	  Turkic	  in	  origin.	  Georgia’s	  independent	  nature	  and	  its	  embrace	  of	  western	  principles,	  physically	  shown	  by	  Georgia’s	  ambition	  to	  join	  NATO,	  led	  Russia	  to	  retaliate	  by	  ceding	  parts	  of	  its	  territories	  to	  ethnic	  minorities,	  thus	  threatening	  Georgia’s	  sovereignty.	  	  	  
Crimea	  The	  most	  significant	  aspect	  of	  the	  Crimean	  Crisis	  is	  the	  scale	  and	  visibility	  of	  Russia’s	  actions.	  Russia	  annexed	  Crimea	  using	  its	  military	  forces	  without	  constraint.	  In	  both	  the	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  conflict	  and	  the	  Russo-­‐Georgian	  War,	  Russia	  aided	  separatists	  in	  order	  to	  weaken	  states	  that	  were	  not	  longer	  acting	  favorably	  towards	  Russia,	  but	  in	  this	  case,	  Russia	  actively	  seized	  sovereign	  territory	  for	  itself.	  Although	  the	  annexation	  of	  Crimea	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  punishment	  for	  Ukrainian	  pro-­‐western	  ideals,	  it	  is	  a	  singular	  occurrence	  in	  recent	  history	  for	  Russia	  to	  seize	  territory	  with	  
irredentist	  claims.	  The	  incident	  is	  a	  reminder	  of	  Russia’s	  former	  imperial	  glory,	  which	  the	  government	  attempts	  to	  capitalize	  on	  in	  order	  to	  garner	  domestic	  support.	  Analysts	  are	  reading	  Russia’s	  actions	  in	  various	  ways,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  yet	  clear	  what	  Russia	  further	  intentions	  are	  in	  the	  FSU,	  but	  one	  can	  grasp	  that	  Russia	  is	  pursuing	  a	  rigorous	  foreign	  policy	  in	  its	  ‘near	  aboard’.	  The	  Russian	  government	  is	  capitalizing	  on	  Russia’s	  imperial	  history	  to	  excuse	  its	  militaristic	  foreign	  policy.	  	  Whether	  Russia	  will	  seek	  to	  annex	  other	  territories	  is	  unknown	  at	  this	  point,	  but	  the	  most	  fragile	  region	  currently	  is	  Eastern	  Ukraine.	  	  
	  
What	  can	  we	  learn?	  The	  west	  must	  be	  careful	  in	  its	  negotiations	  with	  Russia	  and	  the	  Former	  Soviet	  Union.	  Although	  western	  powers	  have	  a	  greater	  sense	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  economic	  power,	  western	  organizations’	  involvement	  in	  former	  soviet	  republics	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  major	  threat	  by	  Russia.	  Thus,	  if	  NATO	  and	  the	  EU	  are	  looking	  to	  expand	  membership	  to	  nations	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  or	  other	  areas	  once	  under	  Russian	  control,	  its	  progression	  must	  be	  moderate	  and	  calculated.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  West	  has	  power	  over	  Russia	  because	  of	  its	  relative	  economic	  and	  political	  strength.	  The	  Russian	  government	  under	  President	  Putin	  often	  resorts	  to	  violence	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  ‘soft	  power’	  influence	  it	  wields.	  Russia	  officials	  are	  able	  to	  procrastinate	  effective	  negotiations	  but	  rarely	  officiate	  affective	  peace	  talks.	  Part	  of	  this	  is	  because	  it	  is	  in	  Russian	  interest	  to	  breed	  chaos	  and	  discontent	  in	  its	  former	  republics,	  so	  as	  to	  secure	  their	  dependence	  on	  Russia.	  However,	  a	  significant	  portion	  is	  that	  Russia	  realizes	  that	  much	  of	  the	  western	  world	  no	  longer	  sees	  Russia	  as	  an	  important	  
world	  power,	  but	  merely	  a	  nuisance,	  a	  big	  bully.	  Russia	  fuels	  controversy	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  relevant.	  Now	  that	  the	  West	  is	  paying	  more	  attention	  and	  concern	  to	  Russian	  involvement	  in	  the	  FSU	  and	  shows	  that	  it	  is	  willing	  to	  punish	  Russia	  for	  its	  actions,	  the	  time	  may	  comes	  when	  the	  West	  develops	  an	  effective	  policy	  to	  mitigate	  Russian	  power	  in	  the	  region.	  Russia	  will	  not	  back	  down	  easily,	  and	  it	  is	  most	  likely	  that	  there	  will	  be	  more	  conflict	  to	  come,	  but	  the	  FSU	  could	  become	  more	  independent	  and	  maintain	  a	  multi-­‐vector	  foreign	  policy	  if	  other	  world	  powers	  continue	  to	  take	  interest	  and	  invest	  in	  the	  region.	  	  Russia’s	  aggressive	  foreign	  policy	  developed	  because	  of	  elitist	  egoism.	  President	  Putin	  is	  especially	  known	  for	  his	  personality	  cult	  as	  well	  as	  his	  concrete	  and	  intimidating	  domestic	  political	  tactics.	  Recently,	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  opposition	  party	  PARNAS	  (Republican	  Party	  of	  Russia	  –	  People’s	  Freedom	  Party),	  Boris	  Nemtsov,	  was	  assassinated	  close	  to	  the	  Kremlin,	  and	  his	  second	  in	  command	  is	  imprisoned.	  	  President	  Putin	  denies	  responsibility	  for	  the	  murder	  and	  claims	  it	  is	  a	  tragic	  crime,	  but	  many	  believe	  Russian	  authorities	  are	  to	  blame	  (Northam).	  The	  Russian	  elite	  eliminates	  threats	  to	  its	  proliferation	  and	  appeals	  to	  the	  public’s	  sense	  of	  solidarity	  in	  light	  of	  their	  imperial	  past,	  Russia’s	  ‘age	  of	  glory’.	  Russia	  was	  a	  great	  power	  during	  the	  cold	  war	  and	  the	  age	  of	  empires,	  but	  has	  lost	  political	  clout.	  President	  Putin	  pursues	  a	  vigorous	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  near	  abroad	  to	  prove	  to	  Russian	  citizens	  and	  western	  governments	  alike	  that	  Russia	  is	  recovering	  and	  is	  once	  again	  a	  great	  power.	  	  This	  also	  distracts	  Russian	  citizens	  from	  the	  dirty	  maintenance	  required	  to	  keep	  up	  such	  as	  regime.	  	  
The	  Russian	  government	  will	  go	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  garner	  domestic	  approval.	  The	  Russian	  economy	  is	  suffering	  from	  western	  imposed	  sanctions	  as	  well	  as	  a	  lack	  of	  modern	  infrastructure.	  President	  Putin	  and	  his	  cohorts	  are	  aware	  of	  this	  and	  strategically	  maintain	  an	  interventionist	  foreign	  policy	  in	  order	  to	  convince	  their	  citizens	  that	  Russia	  is	  a	  strong	  world	  power,	  erstwhile	  distracting	  Russian	  inhabitants	  from	  the	  lackluster	  conditions	  at	  home.	  Russian	  officials	  under	  President	  Putin’s	  leadership	  use	  the	  concept	  of	  hard	  power	  to	  sustain	  Russia’s	  image	  as	  a	  relevant	  world	  power	  not	  only	  at	  home	  but	  in	  the	  ‘near	  abroad’	  and	  western	  political	  sphere.	  Although	  western	  nations	  realize	  the	  internal	  struggles	  Russia	  faces,	  they	  are	  cognizant	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  Putin	  is	  able	  to	  manipulate	  negotiations	  without	  facing	  a	  direct	  military	  threat	  to	  Russia	  itself.	  It	  is	  unknown	  how	  the	  East-­‐West	  dichotomy	  will	  play	  out	  in	  the	  future,	  but	  it	  is	  certain	  to	  be	  an	  important	  geo-­‐political	  game	  for	  some	  time,	  and	  Russia	  is	  sure	  to	  play	  a	  large	  part	  in	  it.	  	  
America and Europe have more control at their disposal than they realize. 
Russia is fully aware that although they see the West as antagonists, they need 
the economic and social support that western organizations such as the EU can 
provide in order to rebuild itself as a world power. Western Nations are members 
of many negotiation platforms for unresolved conflicts that comprise the Minsk 
Group concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the Geneva discussions 
concerning Georgia’s separatist republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This 
affords an opportunity for lucid and constructive Western engagement. 
Although in the short term this may result in caustic relations with Russia, 
leading the latter to continue its damaging foreign policy, the Russian 
government would learn that the West is taking the post-Soviet space seriously 
(Cornell).  
The United States and Europe are capable of significant bilateral and 
regional discussions with nations that are privy to frozen conflicts. Holding 
conferences with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine would deepen the sense of 
trust and security between East and West and enable further objectives toward 
cooperation. This would allow Russia to realize that its ‘sphere of influence’ is 
not accepted by Western nations, and shows that the latter will use whatever 
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